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Abstract 
 
Purpose: The paper seeks to investigate the effect of asymmetric information in an exchange 
relationship involving pre-screening by insurers, trust between insurer and policyholder, self-
protection provided by different kinds of contracts on hidden action in the Egyptian car insurance 
market.  
Design, methodology and approach: The total population of all registered non-life insurance 
companies (32) in Egypt as approved by the Egyptian Financial Services Association (EFSA), the 
regulatory body in the insurance industry in Egypt, constitute the sampling frame for this study. In 
this study, respondents answered questions about their most recent cases of compensation by 
insurers based on a questionnaire. A total of 63 questionnaires were distributed and regression 
analysis was used to test and validate the hypotheses of this study.  
Findings: Information asymmetry is one of the main antecedents of hidden action problems by 
policyholders. The level of pre-screening done by insurer also goes a long way in attenuating 
hidden action. Furthermore, the level of trust in an exchange relationship attenuates the hidden 
action problems faced by policyholders. Moreover, the study found that self-protection attenuates 
hidden action problems at different types of contracts. It was further observed that self-protection 
is more efficient in genuinely attenuating hidden action with co-payment car insurance contract 
than with deductible car insurance contract. 
Research limitation/implications: As a result of numerous constraint in the field during the data 
collection phase, this study had a reasonable sample size which the authors would have easily 
increased; 63 responses have been obtained for this study and as such is not exhaustive to 
generalize the findings. In addition, a cross sectional design was used at a particular time and as 
such this study does not inform changes in the market over time. Thus such is a provision for future 
research of longitudinal study to cater for market dynamics.  
Theoretical implication: The level of information asymmetry in a buyer seller relationship is an 
antecedent for hidden action problems; as one party (policyholder) possess private information 
which the other party (insurer) desires and might lack due to self-seeking attitude of potential 
policyholders and they use this idiosyncratic information in purchasing their insurance policy.  
xi 
 
However, when insurer execute high level of pre-screening it serves as a basis to attract appropriate 
and high quality policyholder by revealing adequate information that help insurer in making selling 
decision; this can serve as proactive strategy in attenuating hidden action.  
An exchange relationship characterized by trust tend to significantly weakens and attenuate hidden 
action problems by policyholders. 
Managerial implication: Hidden action is very harmful for the smooth and sustainable operation 
of business especially in the insurance market. This study has highlighted the antecedent of hidden 
action which business leaders and managers should take seriously in conducting business as it can 
ruin the performance of their client in honouring their contract. Also, it adversely affects exchange 
relationship, reduce market share and supply chain efficiency, increase the loss reserve of insurer, 
reduces profitability and affect the health of insurer’s balance sheet. Thus, it is prudent to engage 
and coordinate effectively in an exchange relationship, developing trust which improves 
coordination and cooperation between trading partners and business performance. 
Keywords: hidden action problems, trust, self-protection, information asymmetry, pre-screening, 
kind of contract, size of damages, policyholders, insurers, insurance industry, Egypt, principal 
agent theory, relational contracting theory. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT 
1.1 Background Information about the Insurance Industry 
The global insurance industry has been a growing and thriving business, especially in the western 
and developed nations that have dominated the trade for a very long time, including the United 
States, Japan, and some European countries. The United States alone accounted for 27% of the 
world’s global insurance premium, Japan for 11%, and China and some European countries largely 
dominated the remainder. The Group of Seven (G7) nations account for more than 65% of the 
global insurance premium with only 10% of the world’s population living in those regions. In these 
economies, the per capita expenditure on insurance premium is $3,910 while people in emerging 
markets like Africa spend an average $120 per person (KPMG 2012, OECD 2015, Rorbye 2013, 
Re 2015). 
However, the insurance industry in Africa is still at its embryonic stage. It is growing rapidly, but 
is still largely underdeveloped. There is a glaringly low penetration of insurance in the African 
market, for which a range of factors is responsible. It is not only the inability to pay for insurance 
products; there is a lack of expertise in this sector, and the perceived challenges and peculiarities 
in the business environment in Africa bear no less blame. Foreign companies with the required 
expertise and knowhow are unwilling to invest and develop this sector in Africa. Another challenge 
that multinationals cite for their reluctance to invest in the African insurance industry is the lack 
of appropriate platforms to gather accurate and comprehensive information about individuals and 
businesses to assess their creditworthiness. In addition, the weak and poor judicial system in Africa 
makes things complicated; investors are always in a dilemma to put their money in a sector that 
relies heavily on highly developed and functioning judicial and financial sectors, among other 
factors (KPMG 2012). 
Another critical factor for the underdevelopment of the insurance sector in the continent is the 
underdeveloped financial system, which is still at a young stage, and is unable to capitalize on 
insurance and re-insurance activities. Moreover, most regions in Africa use informal insurance as 
opposed to the services provided by the formal insurance sector (KPMG 2012). However, the 
insurance industry is a very vital business to further the socio-economic aspirations of any nation, 
and Egypt is no exception. 
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The Egyptian insurance industry has shown resilience and grown at an impressive rate despite the 
upheavals the country has gone through in recent years. This sector has been crucial in managing 
the risks of other sectors and in facilitating growth across the different sectors. It has done this by 
pooling the risks of individuals and businesses, managing these risks, and by investing the capital 
accumulated from the premiums of policyholders in various sectors of the economy, which is 
essential for the growth of the economy and society as a whole. This has happened despite the 
recent upheaval that saw a fall in the Egyptian GDP from 5.1% in 2010 to 1.8% in 2011, and 2.2% 
in 2012 (Wagdi 2014, (EFSA) 2014a). 
Nonetheless, this did not affect the insurance industry, which has grown consistently over the 
years. It has recorded a compounded annual growth rate of 9.2% between 2008 and 2012, of which 
the non-life insurance sector accounted for 47.1% of the total gross premium in the industry, 
amounting to EGP 5 billion in 2012 alone. The non-life segment has been driving overall growth 
in the sector with demand for property and causality insurance products surging. Motor insurance 
accounted for 40% and property, approximately 30% of the total written premiums in 2012 
((EFSA) 2014a, Wagdi 2014). 
Moreover, a range of complex inter-firm relationships—starting from that between the insurers 
and the policyholder, to that among other strategic players in the industry—characterizes the 
industry. The insurer provides a range of products oriented towards different activities in the 
various sectors of the economy and the policyholders’ need to enhance and facilitate their business 
operations and safeguard those from risks. The policyholders do not have the wherewithal and 
knowhow to effectively manage these risks and transfer these to the insurance companies. 
However, the dilemma of this exchange relationship remains hard to manage. If people have 
insurance coverage, their behaviour changes in a way that can increase their expected expenses. 
This affects the cost of the insurer’s business and the general cost of coverage, which both 
deductible and co-payment contracts can mitigate (Shavell 1979b, Pauly 2007). 
Since usually after signing the contract, policyholders do not have the incentive to invest in self-
insurance or protection—which is very costly and policyholders often see no value in incurring 
additional cost after securing a policy—this often leads to ‘hidden action’ problems. The higher 
the cost of self-insurance, the lower is the incentive to invest more.  
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In the context of insurance, ‘hidden action’ refers to a situation wherein policyholders make less 
effort to mitigate the possibility of the risks they are insured against from happening (Keser and 
Willinger 2000, Pauly 2007, Tumay 2009). 
According to agency theory, the principal (insurer) enters into a transaction with the agents 
(policyholders) but both parties have different interests in the transaction. The principal cannot 
observe every action of the agent and capture or rationalize all outcomes in a contract; the agents 
are bound to be self-seeking and pursue their interests. This dilemma poses numerous challenges 
for the principal-agent relationship, and represents the typical principal-agent problem. Due to the 
hidden action problems, agents are disinterested and have no incentive to pursue the goals of the 
principal as they have of their own; this divergence of goals presents a serious problem for the 
principal-agent interaction. In the case of insurance, policyholders have no incentive to self-protect 
or insure after they have bought coverage as this involves additional cost, which they are unwilling 
to incur in most cases (Keser and Willinger 2007, 2000). 
This triggers both adverse selection and hidden action problems as the principal cannot detect the 
value of a parameter—the true characteristics of the agent—and monitor his activities after the 
signing of the contractual agreement, since the process is very expensive and impractical 
(Guesnerie and Laffont 1984). Nonetheless, to reduce the hidden action problem (moral hazard), 
insurers use both deductible and co-payment riders (Tumay 2009). 
However, Relational Contracting Theory (RCT) shows that the partners in an exchange 
relationship develop trust mostly through repeated transactions; this will strengthen the 
relationship as partners develop norms and values they are bound to uphold because of the 
deepened relationship. This will obviously minimize the possibility of moral hazard as partners 
look beyond the transaction and focus on the relationship and norms within it. It will foster a 
mutually beneficial relationship between the exchange partners (Buvik and Reve 2002, Macneil 
1977). 
This study seeks to analyse the dyadic relationship between policyholders and insurers. It has used 
appropriate theoretical framework as a basis to explain the complex dynamics embedded in such 
interactions. 
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1.2 Research Problem 
This study focuses on the hidden action problems (moral hazard) in the Egyptian car insurance 
market for business policyholders; it tries to ascertain their magnitude and how those affects the 
insurers’ businesses and the general economy. To form a robust basis for analysis, the authors will 
use constructs from extant literature and appropriate theoretical framework from the Principal 
Agent Theory (PTA) and the RCT. These actions are a function of related exchange hazard (hidden 
action/moral hazard) that alters the motives of businesses to prevent loss, as Steven (1979) and 
Tumay (2009) depict and elucidate. 
Extant literature has considerably explored the principal-agent problem in the form of a buyer-
seller relationship. The problem occurs when a principal (insurer) hires an agent (policyholder) to 
carry out certain obligations, but their ultimate goal in the exchange is different. As such, each 
party is inclined to pursue its individual interest, which leads to hidden action problems (moral 
hazards). In insurance, this happens when the projected loss from a certain adverse event increases 
as the coverage increases. This can take varying forms, such as when a partner deliberately neglects 
his/her obligations in an agreement. In the case of car insurance, it amounts to not honouring the 
maintenance schedule when it’s due and not getting the maintenance done at the approved centres 
under the agreement, speeding, drink driving, failing to invest in a system to protect the car from 
accidents, recruiting drivers without proper background check and qualifications, etc.  
Thus, these post-contractual actions involve costs that the other partner is not willing to invest in 
after securing the policy (Pauly 2007). This will increase the probability of the happening of the 
risks against which the policyholders are insured. This, in its turn, will increase the amount of 
claims from customers, adversely affecting the insurance company’s profitability. Insurance 
companies will thus increase their loss reserve since they cannot monitor the actions of 
policyholders after signing the contract, which is in most cases impractical and prohibitively 
expensive. 
Against this background, the authors seek to analyse the moral hazard problems prevalent in the 
Egyptian car insurance industry, to identify the root causes of this problem, and proffer solutions 
based on evidence gathered from the market, which will serve as a panacea for insurers and 
policyholders to forge a fruitful and healthy business relationship. To analyse this problem, the 
authors have used a theoretical framework to serve as a concrete basis for detailed elaboration of 
this issue; they have used a paradigm from the PAT and the RCT.  
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These theories have shed light on the nature and dynamics of exchange relationships similar to the 
one under consideration, i.e. between insurers and policyholders. In short, this work seeks to 
address the research questions below: 
1. What are the antecedents of hidden action problems in a business-to-business relationship, i.e. 
between the insurer and the business policyholder? 
2. How can the hidden action problems in the car insurance industry in Egypt be attenuated? 
 
1.3 Objective of the Study 
This work primarily seeks to analyse the antecedents of hidden action problems in a buyer-seller 
relationship in the Egyptian car insurance industry, with a focus on the exchange relationship 
between the insurers and policyholders. This exchange relationship forms the unit of analysis of 
the hidden action problems in the industry. 
One of the main antecedents of hidden action is information asymmetry wherein one partner in an 
exchange has more information compared with the other one. He/she uses this information 
advantage while buying the insurance policy, which tends to perpetuate hidden action by the 
policyholder and as such has very huge financial and business implications for insurers. However, 
with a proper and adequate pre-screening process, insurers can validate policyholders and 
categorize them according to their risk profile, which ensures that they pay an actuarially fair 
premium that is healthy for the insurer’s balance sheet and business.  
Furthermore, the level of pre-screening done by insurers helps them to determine the 
characteristics of the policyholders and, through the screening process, categorize this information 
to attenuate hidden action and thus, maximize profit. The amount the policyholder is willing to 
invest in self-protection goes a long way to attenuate hidden action because self-protection reduces 
its level. Insurance companies can also use their internal policy to attenuate hidden action based 
on the kind of contract they sell policyholders. That is because customers tend to behave differently 
based on the nature of the contract. In short, the degree of trust in an exchange relationship 
attenuates hidden action, as policyholders tend to honour their obligations in a business 
relationship. They are then less likely to behave opportunistically as trust results in repeated 
satisfactory business dealings over time.  
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1.4 Justification for the Study 
Insurance is one of the fastest growing service sectors in the Egyptian economy. Despite the recent 
political upheaval and fall in GDP growth, the sector is still recording impressive growth and has 
huge untapped potential. This sector has continued to serve as an engine of growth for other sectors 
in the economy; businesses rely on the insurance market to shoulder and manage their risks, 
provide the necessary investment in the economy, etc. In addition, the insurance sector provides 
employment to many people (KPMG 2012, (EFSA) 2014a). 
Therefore, because of the ever-growing insurance industry in Egypt, the landscape and dynamics 
of the sector and its players will evolve to adapt to this change. New and complex firms will emerge 
and the nature of relationships will change considerably. To manage this change effectively, the 
nature and the level of interactions between the players in the sector, such as insurers, 
policyholders, regulatory authorities, rating agencies, consultants, government authorities, etc., 
have to be in line with the dynamic trends in the sector. Thus, it is important to study inter-firm 
relationships in the insurance industry (Wagdi 2014). 
Justifiably, this study primarily seeks to explore the antecedents of hidden action problems in the 
Egyptian car insurance market and provide suggestions to attenuate those in the exchange 
interaction between the insurer and the business policyholder. 
In short, the buyer-seller relationship remains at a rudimentary stage in the service industry 
compared with the manufacturing industry. Thus, deepening our understanding of the inter-firm 
relationship in the service sector is another huge incentive for this study. 
 
1.5 Scope and Delimitation of the Study 
The Egyptian insurance industry comprises numerous players, ranging from the standard insurance 
companies, the ‘Takaful’, which are traditional insurance companies that base their exchange 
policies on Islamic principles, policyholders, reinsurance companies, and the EFSA, which is 
responsible for regulating, enforcing and monitoring insurance activities in Egypt. EFSA has its 
mandate from the central government. There are many other players, who participate both directly 
and indirectly in the market. However, this study delineates the dyadic buyer-seller relationship 
between insurers and policyholders in the insurance value chain. Against this background, this 
study extends the PAT and the RCT in the service industry to the insurance industry. 
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Moreover, because of this expected growth in overall activities in the industry, and given that the 
industry has huge untapped potential, there will emerge complex new challenges and the 
arrangement to manage those. No one has exhaustively addressed the hidden action (moral 
hazard)—a dilemma that emerges in a growing insurance industry—in the Egyptian one. This 
study will provide insight into the nature of hidden action problems and make recommendations 
to mitigate it. This provides an adequate justification for the choice of Egypt as the research setting.  
This sector is pivotal for absorbing the risks in various other sectors across the economy and 
providing the required investment to facilitate economic growth and development. Therefore, it is 
important to analyse and scrutinize the activities in this sector to come up with informed 
suggestions so that policymakers and government authorities can take proper decisions. That 
would help the sector to continue to grow and serve as a reliable industry to support growth 
activities across the economy.  
However, because of numerous constraints—largely financial and time—the study sample mainly 
comprises insurance companies headquartered in Cairo, which is the commercial capital of Egypt. 
Nonetheless, the choice of sample was largely merit-based as the bulk of insurance activity 
happens in Cairo, and all major insurance companies have an office there. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
This study comprises nine chapters. Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to and a background of 
the insurance industry in Egypt, the nature of the research problem under consideration, and the 
justification of the study. Chapter 2 presents the current trends in the insurance industry, service 
characteristics, and relevance of Egypt as the research setting. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical 
framework relevant for the study. The authors used these theories to formulate the conceptual 
framework of the study. Chapter 4 presents the conceptual model. In addition, the authors develop 
the hypotheses in this chapter, based on the theoretical background and the dynamics of the 
insurance industry.  
Chapter 5 gives details of the research design and the methodology used in the study. Chapter 6 
gives the definitions and the operationalization of the variables. Chapter 7 presents measurement 
and data validations. Chapter 8 delineates the regression model and the hypotheses of the study. 
Finally, Chapter 9 gives a summary of the findings and a detailed discussion. In addition, it also 
gives the limitations and implications of this work and a proposition for future research. 
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1.7 Summary  
This chapter has provided a detailed background of the proposed study and stated the research 
problem that forms the basis of this study. It has also given an overview of the objective, 
justification, scope and delimitation, and the organization of the study. The research gap is clearly 
due to very little contribution of the theoretical framework, such as the PAT, and the RCT, to the 
service industry, which this study tends to highlight. It also seeks to contribute to the existing work 
on the service industry. The next chapter will give details of the nature and dynamics of the 
Egyptian insurance industry. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RESEARCH SETTING 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives a brief synopsis of the global insurance industry, and pinpoints the trends and 
peculiarities of the Egyptian car insurance industry, which is the focus of the study. It details the 
activities of policyholders and the manner in which they interact with insurers while buying 
policies, and further discusses how this interaction leads to hidden action. This chapter gives a 
detailed description of the insurance industry and its value chain. The authors conclude it by 
discussing the relevance of the Egyptian market as the basis of this research. 
 
2.2 Insurance Industry Overview 
The global insurance industry has been consistently growing over the years. The demand for 
insurance increases as activities and innovation in the global economy rise, as business tends to 
edge past risks and unforeseen eventualities, thus assuring continuity and sustainability in 
operations. In 2015, some positive outcomes could be seen because of macroeconomic 
improvement in several regions and countries, the ever-increasing middle class, and high-net-
worth individuals. These factors formed the foundation of a growing and rising insurance sector 
globally (Young 2015). 
The global insurance industry premium is $5 trillion, with a global insurance capital of $4.2 trillion, 
global causality property premium of $1.4 trillion, and a 6% growth in global insurance capital. 
The global property causality capital is $1.3 trillion, with a 1.9% property causality penetration in 
the top 50 countries, and an estimated 39% growth if the penetration level increases by 2.5%. 
Insurers are capitalizing on modern technology (analytics, cloud computing) and modelling 
techniques to deepen their market segmentation strategies, reduce the amount of claims, and to 
improve underwriting capabilities and risk management.  
In addition, they are investing hugely in technologies that improve the existing processes and 
collaboration with policyholders as well as regulatory authorities (Aon annual market report 2015).  
Insurance contributes significantly to economic growth by creating a climate conducive for 
investment, and promotes activities that would be cumbersome and implausible to do in the 
absence of the risk management instrument that the insurance functions provide (Rorbye 2013). 
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However, this favourable picture of the global insurance market has cascaded to other markets 
across the world. For instance, the Egyptian insurance industry has shown resilience and consistent 
improvement over the years. Despite the numerous challenges in emerging markets and developing 
countries, there is a huge growth potential, which growing economies and the growing wealth of 
emerging economies largely dictate. With constant improvement in insurance possibilities and a 
change in the consumer mindset, opportunities are opening up in the sector (Rorbye 2013). 
Nonetheless, the degree of loss in guaranteeing non-life insurance keeps increasing, which is a 
serious concern and can be largely attributed to moral hazard and hidden information problems as 
most insurance companies in Africa are state-owned and some others are closely linked with it 
(Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998). The gross premium of Egyptian insurance amounted to LE 14.4 
billion in 2013-2014, representing a growth of 12.5% from LE 12.5 billion in 2012-2013. This 
amount was generated from both life and non-life insurance businesses, of which LE 6.15 billion 
was from life insurance and an estimated LE 8.2 billion from non-life insurance. In 2014, insurance 
premium contributed 1.2% to the Egyptian GDP. Nonetheless, the insurance industry has a 
tremendous growth potential, considering the low insurance density in the country (premium per 
capita) and the level of insurance business penetration (premium per GDP). The insurance density 
of gross premium grew from $21.6 to $22.3 between 2013 and 2014 ((EFSA) 2014a). 
This consistent growth and the huge part of the industry that remains untapped present a huge 
opportunity for the insurance business in Egypt. Moreover, the gross claim paid out for the period 
amounted to EGP 7.3 billion, representing a 5% increase from EGP 6.9 billion in 2013. Investment 
in the sector has also grown to EGP 48.5 billion, which represents a 14.6% increase in investment 
compared with EGP 42.3 billion in the previous year (KPMG 2012, (EFSA) 2014a). 
 
2.3 Egyptian Insurance Market 
The Egyptian insurance market has 32 registered and licensed insurance companies, with 13 of 
these offering mainly life insurance products and the remaining 19 offering non-life insurance 
products that cover property and causality.  
There is also a cooperative insurance company, an export credit society, and 610 private insurance 
funds. In addition to these, there are eight Takaful (Islamic) insurance companies, three of those 
offering life insurance and the remaining five dealing in non-life products. The table below shows 
the breakdown of both commercial and Takaful insurance businesses:  
13 
 
No. of insurance companies based on Commercial and Takaful 
Activity 2012 2013 2014 
Commercial business 23 23 24 
Takaful business 8 8 8 
Total 31 31 32 
Table 1.1: No. of insurance businesses (both commercial and Takaful) in Egypt 
Over the years, the number of players in the market has been relatively stable. However, there has 
been a substantial increase in the size of their operations and portfolios, leading to an increase in 
market share, improvement in financial outcomes, and increase in investment in the sector. 
Between 2013 and 2014, gross investment in the sector increased by 14%. Income from investment 
and other sources rose too; interest from reinsurance deposits and gains realized on exchange 
amounted to EGP 4.7 billion in 2014, surpassing by 23.3% the EGP 3.7 billion achieved in the 
previous year. Policyholders’ rights also grew by an impressive 11.4% in the same period ((EFSA) 
2014a). 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has economically grown rapidly over the last 
decade despite the numerous challenges and instabilities in some of its countries. Other challenges 
that remain are the transformation of the local economies and inclusive job creation, especially for 
the growing young population. The insurance sector is vital for providing the necessary conditions 
for socio-economic advancement and for supporting sustainable long-term economic growth. It is 
a very pivotal sector to address the myriad challenges. Insurance provides cushion against adverse 
economic situations through risk transfer and provision of capital. It thus contributes to economic 
development and offers risk-management mechanism, and thus increases the total welfare effect 
in society by bringing policyholders to their pre-loss conditions and supporting overall economic 
activities (Berno 2013). 
 
2.4 Insurers’ Activities and Functions of Insurance 
The insurance industry is very critical in any economy because of several reasons. For one thing, 
it enhances the social and economic outcomes of individuals through effective risk management—
policyholders can transfer their risks and other unforeseen eventualities to their insurers. Thus, 
insurance serves as a reliable and efficient mechanism to safeguard individuals and businesses 
against adverse and devastating outcomes that may have huge consequences.  
14 
 
Insurance mitigates risks and facilitates business and economic activities, and ensures continuity 
of business operations. The following are some of the key functions and benefits of insurance. 
Benefits and functions of insurance 
Payment of losses: Insurance mainly serves as a guarantee of continuity, and secures businesses 
against unforeseen eventualities and uncertainties that may ruin a business or bring a project to an 
abrupt halt. For instance, a business failure will not only lead to financial hardship for its promoters 
and managers, the impact will be devastating and far-reaching if they cannot meet their 
commitment to their employees, customers, and suppliers. With insurance, the business can 
resume operations almost immediately and protect the interests and activities of the company and 
its stakeholders (Vaughan and Vaughan 2007). 
Loss prevention: Insurance promotes activities oriented towards self-assurance and protection by 
promoting a culture of safety that significantly reduces the losses. For instance, automobile 
insurance encourages the use of seat belts, installation of vehicle-tracking devices and accident-
prevention systems. All these measures serve to minimize accidents and losses (Vaughan and 
Vaughan 2007). 
Credit support: Financial institutions rely heavily on insurance to ensure that they can recover 
the loans/credits they give out in the event of unforeseen eventualities. This helps banks to secure 
their lending and take the edge off any adverse uncertain situation. Moreover, a substantial amount 
of the premium is invested in the financial industry. It is also a huge part of the total investment, 
and contributes to boosting the economy by its multiplier effect—it gives more liquidity to the 
financial market, which can utilize it for additional lending and other investments (Berno 2013). 
Economic growth: Insurance serves as an efficient mechanism for the transfer of risk through risk 
pooling. Policyholders contribute funds in the form of premium to a pool, which serves as a basis 
to cover possible risks. It is essentially based on the law of large numbers, as the amount 
contributed to this pool cannot cover the maximum loss if it happens. Insurance is the second 
largest contributor to investment in the Egyptian economy, second only to commercial banking as 
most of the premium collected from policyholders is invested in the different portfolios that 
facilitate economic growth across the economy (Brainard 2008). 
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2.5 Relationship between the Insurer and the Policyholder 
This forms the basis for this study, whose purpose is to evaluate and analyse the relationship 
between the insurer and the policyholders in the Egyptian insurance industry. The parties are 
dependent on each other. An effective collaboration will enhance mutual interest in the form of a 
buyer-seller relationship, the buyer being the policyholder and the seller being the insurer. Insurers 
offer policyholders—both individuals and businesses—products that serve as a reliable measure 
to protect against risks and uncertainties. However, there are lot of challenges in this interaction, 
both before and after the signing of the contract. The chief among those is the problem of adverse 
selection and moral hazards (hidden actions) (Tumay 2009, KPMG 2012). 
The focus of this study is on the latter in the context of the Egyptian car insurance industry for 
businesses. We seek to investigate the degree of existence of moral hazards, which normally occur 
after the signing of the contract (ex-post) in this segment of the insurance industry. After buying 
insurance coverage, most businesses do not have the incentive to invest in self-insurance or 
protection, such as safety measures, which they often find expensive. Thus, they rely on the 
insurance companies to intervene if there is any accident or when the actual risk, against which 
they are insured, happens. This leads to moral hazard problems because it is very difficult for 
insurance companies to implement effective monitoring mechanisms, which are very costly, and 
in some cases, implausible.  
This dilemma has been a perennial problem of the insurance market. Researchers have suggested 
different strategies to deal with it. The most used among those is proper contracting by including 
deductible and co-payment riders. However, these methods are not exhaustive and cannot 
rationalize all the dynamics and possible outcomes of a contractual agreement. Thus, the 
relationship between the insurers and policyholders is crucial in determining the outcome of a 
certain coverage transaction. Hence, better collaboration and effective coordination between these 
parties is important for a mutually beneficial relationship (Guesnerie and Laffont 1984, Tumay 
2009). 
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2.6 Insurance Industry’s Service Characteristics 
2.6.1 Intangibility 
Insurance services are intangible, that is, they cannot be touched or stored. Hence, unlike goods, 
which one can produce in a certain quantity and store in stock keeping units (SKUs), it is difficult 
to manage and account for insurance services. Thus, there will be a shift from holding stock to 
managing capacity; to manage services, one must be efficient and flexible in capacity management 
(Ellram, Tate, and Billington 2004). Moreover, since service is intangible, it is hard to form an 
exhaustive specification at the time of acquisition. It is also difficult to measure quality after 
service delivery. For instance, a car insurance product is intangible since before buying it, 
customers cannot pre-test it as they do with goods. Therefore, some complexities are involved in 
the management of car insurance products (Zhou and Park 2009). 
2.6.2 Simultaneity of Production and Consumption  
The production and consumption of service outputs happen concurrently, usually at the point of 
request. Suppose a policyholder enters an insurance outlet and buys a car insurance product. 
Alternatively, the policyholder can request for the product through an online platform. Thus, 
production and consumption happen at the same time. In the case of goods, the process follows 
sequential stages in production without the customer being present on the factory floor. The goods 
are ready for consumption upon completion of production. Thus, unlike manufactured goods, 
services like insurance products are produced and consumed simultaneously (Zhou and Park 
2009). 
2.6.3 Heterogeneity  
Services offered in the insurance industry are largely heterogeneous. Even within a product, there 
can be different forms of deductibles and other characteristics to differentiate among the services. 
Customers play a huge role in service design. They have different needs, because of which services 
vary. However, the difference in needs also makes it hard to measure and monitor service quality 
(Drzymalski 2012, Ellram, Tate, and Billington 2004). 
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2.6.4 Customer-Supplier Duality  
A famous example of duality comes from the electronics repairing business. A customer walks up 
to the service provider and the service is being provided to the customer as well. That is, service 
cannot begin until the customer supplies the inputs. It is labour intensive and the services provided 
are highly heterogeneous. In addition, the customer is part of the production as well as the 
consumption process (Kato 2010). 
 
2.7 Relevance of Egypt as the Research Setting 
Egypt has one of the largest economies in Africa. Because of the return of stability to the country, 
its economy is growing again and impressive GDP figures are showing strong signs of recovery. 
The Egyptian insurance market is also among the fastest growing ones in the world and in the 
MENA region, showing robust growth over the years.  
However, the outcome of this work will corroborate existing research on similar issues done in 
other parts of the world, especially in western economies. This study will serve as a guide for 
taking relevant policy and regulation decisions in the insurance industry. It will lead to better 
policies and regulations that will enhance and improve the relationship between insurers and 
policyholders, minimize the degree of hidden action problems and foster mutually beneficial 
exchange relationships in the insurance industry ((EFSA) 2014a, KPMG 2012, Rorbye 2013, 
Berno 2013). 
 
2.8 Summary  
This chapter has described and discussed in detail the nature, dynamics, and trends in the insurance 
industry in Egypt. It has also delineated the different activities and functions of the insurance sector 
and the insurer’s relationship with business policyholders. It has also presented the nature and 
characteristics of the service industry, and the way in which its value chain is different from that 
of the manufacturing industry. It has further justified the relevance of Egypt as the research setting. 
The next chapter presents the theoretical framework that this study used.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE AND THEORITICAL REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical perspectives relevant to this study and presents the literature 
review relating to the research problem. As the starting point of the discussion of the theoretical 
perspectives, the authors have presented the definition of hidden action problems. They have used 
two theoretical perspectives in this study, viz. PAT and RCT. The purpose of using the two 
perspectives is to develop the conceptual model of this study. The authors have derived different 
constructs regarding hidden action problems in a buyer-seller relationship from these theoretical 
frameworks. 
 
3.2 Principal Agent Theory   
An agency relationship can be presented as any employment relationship wherein one party (the 
principal) depends on another party (the agent) to undertake an action on behalf of the latter. The 
formal agency literature presents two different but related models. The first one focuses on pre-
contractual and the second on post-contractual issues. There is also a positive branch within the 
theory, mainly concerning the design of appropriate intra-organizational control mechanisms and 
governance. Agency theory uses the contract to describe the relationships in which one party 
delegates work to another (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
The focus of the theory is on determining the most efficient contract in an exchange relationship 
in order to govern it, given the characteristics of the parties involved, and considering the fact that 
the cost of obtaining information and environmental uncertainty in business relationships make it 
impossible for the principal to monitor the agent completely. It is important to realize that most 
agency models define efficiency from the principal’s point of view. The main assumption is that 
the principal is the dominant party in the relationship. Hence, rather than maximizing the benefits 
for both the principal and the agent, the ‘efficient’ contract ensures the best possible outcome for 
the principal, given the constraints imposed by the situation (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker Jr 1992). 
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Two Types of Agency Problems 
When the principal forges a relationship with an agent, it faces two distinct problems. The first 
one—pre-contractual problem—arises when the principal decides to offer an agent a contract. The 
major issue here is deciding on the strategy to find an agent who has the characteristics the 
principal seeks.  
The second problem emerges after the principal and the agent have forged the relationship. It is 
called a ‘post-contractual problem’. The major issue here is to decide on the information strategy 
that the principal should employ to evaluate and reward the agent’s performance to guarantee that 
he/she will be motivated to behave in a manner consistent with the principal’s goals. Pre-
contractual issues are often termed as ‘hidden information’ problems and post-contractual issues 
as ‘hidden action’ problems (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker Jr 1992). 
3.2.1 The Hidden Information Model 
This model deals with the problems a principal may face when it enters into a contractual 
relationship with an agent. These problems crop up largely because of information asymmetry. It 
is quite difficult for the principal to determine ex-ante whether an agent will act opportunistically. 
This situation can be mitigated by screening, examining signals from the potential agent or by 
providing opportunities for self-selection (Arrow 1984).  
Screening 
The principal must have a set of criteria to evaluate a potential agent’s true characteristics and must 
adjust these to the changing environmental conditions over time. The principal can recruit agents 
based only on the information available, without any screening. However, doing that would lead 
to the recruitment of wrong agents, which would lead to poor performance and inefficiency. In this 
case, the principal faces the option between the cost of the screening process or the loss due to 
poor performance. Nonetheless, screening serves as an effective mechanism to combat the problem 
of hidden information, especially when it can reveal key information about potential agents before 
the principal contracts them (Van Osnabrugge 2000).  
The Agent’s Signals 
If the agents know their potential and ability to execute contractual agreements, they tend to signal 
to the principal that they have the desired characteristics the principal is looking for. However, the 
challenge is that some agents will take advantage of such a situation and send a false signal (Morris 
1987).  
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The Principal’s Actions Providing Opportunities for Self-Selection 
The principal should offer incentives to agents to genuinely signal their capabilities and 
willingness to undertake an activity (Arrow 1984).  
3.2.2 The Hidden Action Model 
This model deals with the problems a principal may encounter after signing the contract with the 
agent. The hidden action model makes several assumptions about the principal and the agent. First 
assumption: self-interest motivates the principal and the agent. Such self-interest typically 
translates into maximizing profits (or utility) (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker Jr 1992).  
Second assumption: principals labour under conditions of incomplete information. This implies 
that the agent has more information than the principal does and would like to obtain. The situation 
where one party has information the other desires—and this characterizes most agency 
relationships—is called information asymmetries. The main problem here is that self-interest often 
makes the agent averse to sharing the information with the principal, or even motivates him/her to 
send the principal wrong information (Arrow 1984, Bergen, Dutta, and Walker Jr 1992). 
Third assumption: environmental factors partly determine outcomes. When the principal and the 
agent have conflicting goals and different risk preferences, problems tend to arise in the 
relationship, which lead them to prefer different courses of action. The degree of an individual’s 
or firm’s preference for adventure to security can be thought of as risk preference (Bergen, Dutta, 
and Walker Jr 1992). 
3.2.2.1 First Assumption: Hidden Action Problem is a Moral Hazard in Insurance Markets  
Different authors define moral hazard differently. One of the important definitions is that moral 
hazard is the risk of change in behaviour of one party to a contract to the detriment of the other 
party once the contract has been concluded. With regard to insurance, moral hazard can be defined 
as the propensity of insurance policyholders to make less effort to protect the insured goods against 
theft or damage (Frank and Glass 1991). 
The reason why moral hazard is called a hidden action problem is that it refers to situations where 
one side of the market cannot observe the actions of the other (Bergstrom and Varian 1990). 
Hidden action problems also occur when the policyholder’s action increases the likelihood of a 
loss. However, the insurer cannot know about these actions.  
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This results in a situation where the insurer cannot price the premium and compensations correctly 
because these depend on the actions of the policyholder. This may lead to market failure (Lee 
1992). Furthermore, moral hazard problems arise when policyholders, armed with private 
information, can take actions that can adversely affect the insurer’s outcomes.   
Based on these definitions, the authors could derive some features of moral hazard:  
1. The policyholder whose actions are hidden by either action or inattention, increases the 
probability of a ‘bad’ outcome.  
2. One party, the insurer, cannot observe the (hidden) action of the other party, the policyholder. 
Thereby, it is expected that car insurance gives people an incentive to run into accidents, especially 
if their business is not doing well and they decide that they would rather have the compensation 
for the car from the insurance company than the car itself. It would be suitable for policyholders 
to have an accident that causes injury or property damage. Policyholders may drive worse than 
those who are not insured. However, why does Moral Hazard occur? As mentioned before, moral 
hazard is a hidden action problem. Taking care to avoid a particular loss involves costs. Once the 
policyholder is fully insured, he/she has no incentive to incur these costs since the insurance will 
cover the loss. 
3.2.2.2 Second Assumption: Information Asymmetry  
Making accurate decisions is a core point for firms. However, this decision is always based on the 
extent of availability of knowledge about the other business party. When one party to an economic 
transaction has insufficient knowledge about the other, there is a problem of ‘asymmetric 
information’. In the insurance market, the problem of asymmetric information can occur in two 
stages—first, before the signing of the insurance contract, and second, after signing it. The first 
happens because of absence of knowledge about the other party and the second, because of the 
inability to observe the actions of the other party. 
There are mainly two types of information asymmetry. The first is the ‘hidden characteristic’ type 
and it is relevant to the stage of ex-ante contract and occurs when one party to a transaction knows 
something about itself the other side does not. The second is called the ‘hidden action’ type and it 
is relevant to the stage of ex-post contract, which occurs when one side can take an action that 
affects the other side, but which the other side cannot directly observe (Katz 1998). Regarding the 
hidden characteristic type, the uninformed party can gather some information about the informed 
party in two ways.  
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The first way is ‘signalling’, which could be defined as an observable indicator of a hidden 
characteristic. The second way is screening—the uninformed party’s attempt to sort out the 
informed parties.  
Different literatures mention hidden action as a moral hazard. It is a problem of asymmetric 
information and occurs after the transaction has taken place. This problem can arise when one 
party to the transaction hides some actions from the other, which the latter cannot observe. Adverse 
selection is a problem of asymmetric information and occurs before the transaction has taken place. 
This problem can arise where there is a hidden characteristics problem and the informed side in 
the transaction selects itself in a way that is harmful to the uninformed one (Katz 1998).  
3.2.2.3 Third Assumption: Hidden Action Problems in the Egyptian Car Insurance Market  
The concern about such a hidden action problem arises when a policyholder who insures an asset 
(say, car) fails to maintain it properly (e.g., parks it in a bad neighbourhood). Usually such actions 
are either unobservable by the insurer or are too difficult to be specified in the contract. Therefore, 
the insurance contract could not be directly contingent on such actions.  
As far as moral hazard is concerned, this case is a negative one, since the actions known as moral 
hazards impose an externality on the insurer. Insurers are careful about entering into contracts that 
caution against these (Caillaud and Hermalin 2000). Moral hazard represents a passive form of 
opportunism and occurs when an exchange partner distorts information or misleads the other party 
to protect its own interest, overlooks quality or fails to fulfil promises or obligations stated in the 
contract (John 1984, Wathne and Heide 2000, Williamson 2007). Moral hazard happens when the 
focal firm cannot establish the exchange party’s current performance capabilities due to 
information asymmetry. It also happens due to ‘hold-up’, which arises from unilateral 
idiosyncratic investments that create the potential for exploitation by the focal receiver (Barney 
and Ouchi 1986).  
Tumay (2009) defines moral hazard as the risk that one party to the contract can change its 
behaviour to the detriment of the other after they have signed it. In the insurance market, the 
manner in which people behave towards their insured goods, that is, make less effort to protect 
those, indicates moral hazard. Although the principal-agent analysis is more general than this, the 
name ‘moral hazard’ has stuck.  
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Therefore, the types of problems considered here, such as hidden action problems, are often called 
moral-hazard problems, too. A more descriptive name, which is also used in the literature and has 
been used in this study as well, is ‘hidden action problems’ (Caillaud and Hermalin 2000). Hidden 
action problems occur when a policyholder can take an action that affects the insurer, but the 
insurer cannot directly observe it (Tumay 2009). Hidden action problems also occur when an 
action taken by the policyholders affects the probability and severity of a loss, but the insurer 
cannot observe it.  
In this case, the insurer cannot price the premium and the indemnity correctly since it depends on 
the actions of the policyholders, leading to market failure (Lee 1992). Hidden action problems 
arise in insurance markets when the insurer offers contracts that cover the occurrence of a claim, 
but there is no significant way for the insurer to observe the policyholder’s effort to prevent the 
potential risks. Once established, the conflict between the insurer and the policyholder continues 
(the higher coverage the insurer offers, the lower effort the policyholder makes to prevent the risk) 
(García Rubiano 2009). As mentioned before, the main reason behind the hidden action problem 
is the cost involved in taking precautions and taking care to avoid a potential risk.  
When a policyholder is fully insured, he/she has no reason to incur more costs (Tumay 2009). 
According to Shavell (1979), the effects of static hidden action on the insurance market show that 
the incentives for policyholders to prevent the loss are distorted, especially since the insurer cannot 
observe their actions. In the Egyptian car insurance market, several mechanisms are used to avoid 
such hidden action problems. Some of those are the principle of comparison, which is based on 
two basic concepts—‘previewing’ and ‘reviewing’. The first is used before the contract is signed, 
wherein the insurer sends a group of technical managers to check the car and register all the 
required details. The latter is used after a claim has been made, to discover all possible reasons 
behind the occurrence of the damage and any possible hidden action. Furthermore, the main 
mechanisms that are used in advance when the contract is signed are the deductible and co-
payment riders. 
If the insurer discovers any hidden action by the policyholder, it will not pay the latter any 
compensation and punish him/her with ‘penalty points’ based on the insurance principle of ‘utmost 
good faith’, which both the insurer and the policyholder know. The contract stipulates the 
punishment.  
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Egyptian insurers give some incentives to policyholders so that they are motivated to invest more 
in protecting their cars. There are reward schedules that represent an enforceable contract (e.g., if 
the policyholder obeys the terms of the contract, he/she will get a reward), and there is the ‘contract 
with bonus’, which is offered when the policyholder renews the car insurance contract without 
making any preceding claims. Egyptian insurers only cover models of cars that are not more than 
six years old. The focus of this study is to examine the degree of existence of hidden action 
problems in business-to-business service and to determine the main factors that influence and deter 
the problems.  
Such behaviour would include hiding the following actions or similar: leaving the car unlocked or 
with the engine running, leaving the keys in or the key fobs attached, leaving a window or the roof 
open, damage or loss resulting from another person driving the car without permission, using the 
car for a purpose not mentioned in the contract, crossing the state borders with a domestic contract, 
violation of traffic rules, and getting tricked by fraudsters pretending to be buyers.  
Some more such actions would be not leaving removable in-car electronic equipment in the glove 
compartment or the locked boot, not installing any security or tracking device suggested by the 
insurer, network subscription for any tracking device not being up-to-date or operable, leaving any 
driver-recognition device for a tracking device unattended, drink- driving, not using seatbelts, not 
having a fire-extinguisher in the car, and so on. 
3.2.3 Insurance and Risk 
A long time before the social sciences discovered the institution, insurance agencies were 
designing contracts and negotiating their way around opportunism, monitoring challenges, goal 
conflicts, and incentives. Therefore, insurance companies have so much knowledge about the 
reasons behind the failure of an agency that they even enter into contracts like liability policies for 
breach of fiduciary duty or professional malpractice. As Heimer demonstrated in 1985, 
sociologists have a great deal to learn from the social practices of insurance. They still do (Shapiro 
2005).   
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3.2.4 Agency Costs 
Many tough principals try to minimize agency costs, but all agency relationships do experience 
these. Agency costs can arise from many origins—recruitment, adverse selection, moral hazard, 
specific and discerning preferences, shirking responsibility, stealing, incentives, self-dealing, 
corruption, self-regulation, monitoring and policing, bonding and insurance, agents who oversee 
agents who oversee agents, and failures in costly corrective devices. Since the principal cannot 
observe the agent’s behaviour, they ‘rely on imperfect surrogate measures, which can lead the 
agent to displace his behaviour towards the surrogates in order to appear to be behaving well’ 
(Mitnick 1992). For example, insurers/principals provide the policyholders/agents with prevention 
incentives to motivate them to protect their cars against the potential risks. A few policyholders 
get involved in moral hazard only to gain such incentives.  
Therefore, agency costs can increase if agents concentrate their efforts in the wrong direction 
(Mitnick 1992, Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agency costs can also increase if organizations, such 
as insurance companies, build some paradigms to minimize hidden action problems: create 
balances, rotate employees, implement reporting requirements, fragment responsibilities, 
introduce redundancies, lock revolving doors, add layers of supervision, and so on.  
Such costs increase because fearing abuse, principals impose procedures, decision rules or 
formularies to limit agent discretion. Ironically, principals who seek out agents tell them how to 
take decisions on their behalf. Either the agents lack the expertise to take decisions, or the 
principals tie their hands (Eisenhardt 1989). Since insurers fear that agents (policyholders) might 
act to suit their self-interests, they want them to be disinterested. They take agents out of embedded 
networks where their loyalties and interests are entangled with those of others. Agents may also 
profitably remain in the service of their principals because of their fear of losing social capital, 
reputation, goodwill, and inside information. Principals also fear that agents will get their 
preferences wrong, and therefore construct a protective social edifice that ensures that they will 
get them less right. 
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3.3 Relational Contracting Theory 
Relational Contracting Theory (RCT) assumes that a long-term exchange relationship, in which 
firms conduct business repeatedly, can lead to the emergence of inter-firm relationships. These 
provide a tool—relational norms—that can safeguard the relationship (Bradach and Eccles 1989, 
Buvik and Halskau 2001, Granovetter 1985). Such a relationship tool acts as a defence against 
hidden action by trading partners. Extant theories say that business engagements in an exchange 
relationship are expected to develop certain behaviours, trust, and relational norms that constantly 
govern the methods in which suppliers and manufacturers interact with each other (Buvik and 
Reve 2002, Macneil 1977). 
Trust refers to the predisposition to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence. 
Therefore, the presence of trust in an exchange relationship leads reduced need for contractual 
safeguard against future eventualities (Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993). The duration of 
the relationship is considered to be an important construct, since trust regenerates from exchange 
relationships that occur over time (Buvik and Halskau 2001, Lusch and Brown 1996). 
3.3.1 Relationship Duration, Trust, Relational Norms and Hidden Action Problems 
With regard to this study, this subsection is particularly relevant. The variable ‘trust’ will be in 
focus since this study concentrates on business-to-business relationships. Thus, this variable will 
receive special treatment in this research model and in the subsequent discussions. According to 
Relational Exchange Theory, the prior duration or link duration is the core element of the business 
relationship, which is strongly associated with relational governance (Burki and Buvik 2010). 
The development of norms, such as trust and truthfulness, is based on the history of the 
relationship, which is considered to be a safeguard against hidden action (Buvik and Halskau 
2001). According to Buvik and Halskau (2001), ongoing terms of trade, contractual practices and 
inter-firm interactions could be established by treating the relationship status over time as the point 
of reference. In any business, exchange partners have a limited understanding of each other’s 
norms and values in the initial stages of their relationship; thus, it can make the initial trust very 
difficult (Heide 1994, Burki and Buvik 2010).  
Wathne, Wathne, and Heide (2000) argue that as time passes, norms can stand as informal 
agreements even if formal contracts already exist. In any case, the scope of formal contracts is 
limited due to their finite duration.  
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Relational norms such as trust are generally important if the intention is to build enduring 
relationships. Relational norms involve setting several boundaries on the permissible limits of the 
behaviour of partners, which safeguard against hidden action (Burki and Buvik 2010). The RCT, 
in relevance to this study, is expected to determine the relationship between insurance companies 
and car policyholders due to the business interactions over time. The relationships are expected to 
have some level of trustworthiness, which is expected to deter hidden action despite the existence 
of formal contracts. Therefore, policyholders, in relationships characterized by friendships, 
truthfulness, and trustworthiness, are expected to pose fewer hidden action problems for insurance 
companies. 
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented and discussed the PAT and the RCT to guide this study. The PAT says 
that self-protection, agency costs, information asymmetry, and screening are present whenever 
insurers and policyholders interact. Thus, these are used as mechanisms to adjust the behaviour of 
exchange partners in a buyer-seller relationship, therefore reducing hidden action problems. RCT 
says that relationship norms, duration, and trust guide the behaviour of exchange partners in a 
buyer-seller relationship, thus reducing hidden action problems, too.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REASEARCH SYNTHESIS AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents an overview of the conceptual model based on extant literature elucidated 
and reviewed in the preceding chapter. This study has defined hidden action problems as ‘the 
actions taken by policyholders after signing the contract (ex-post) which are unobservable by the 
insurer’. That is because after obtaining an insurance policy, some policyholders have no incentive 
to safeguard their assets against loss, which would involve additional costs. Examples of these 
actions include, but are not limited to, speeding, non-adherence to maintenance schedule, not 
parking in designated places, not using an anti-lock brake system, not using tracking or safety 
devices as suggested, etc. (Tumay 2009). 
Business policyholders in the Egyptian car insurance market have used hidden action problems as 
the main indicator of opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to develop the 
hypotheses relevant for this study based on the theoretical background—PAT and RCT—as 
highlighted in Chapter 3. This study has identified and used five independent variables to establish 
the research model, as Figure 4.1 below shows. The research model in Figure 4.1 comprises both 
direct effects and interaction effects, as the arrows indicate. Generally, this chapter provides a 
glance into the hypotheses developed for the possible main effects and interaction effects between 
and among the variables. The empirical tests conducted for this purpose will be presented later. 
 
4.2 An Overview of the Research Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model of this study seeks to measure the antecedents of hidden action by business 
policyholders in the Egyptian car insurance market. It also seeks to explore factors that attenuate 
hidden action by policyholders. Increasing trust and mutuality between exchange partners yields 
positive and improved business performance, extant literature has proved. 
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Figur 4.1 Research Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             Direct Effects               Interaction Effects 
 
Source: Authors’ own development from literature review. 
 
Basis of research model and hypothesis development  
The authors will empirically test the influence of the five independent variables shown above in 
figure 4.1 on the dependent variable. The five independent variables are:  
Kind of contract by policyholders (KINDCONTRAC), which denotes the nature of contract the 
insurer gives the policyholders based on their risk profile, degree of risk aversion, and other 
considerations (Shogren and Crocker 2004).  
Self-protection by policyholders (SELFPROT), which is the degree of willingness of the 
policyholder to invest in measures to attenuate the risk insured against (Huang 2006b).  
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Insurer’s information asymmetry (ASYMMINFO), which is the information gap between the 
insurer and the policyholder. How policyholders use this tacit knowledge to influence the outcome 
of the policy is a key antecedent of hidden action problems (Akerlof 1995).  
Pre-screening of insurers (PRESCREEN), which is the amount of effort the insurer expends to get 
vital information about the characteristics of the policyholders to avoid hidden action problems 
(Smart 2000).  
Trust (TRUST), which serves as a measure to attenuate hidden action problems since it ensures 
that partners in an exchange relationship honour their obligations and are accountable to each other 
(Burki and Buvik 2010). 
The dependent variable in the study is Hidden action (HIDDENACT), which are the ex-post 
actions by policyholders unobservable by the insurer (Tumay 2009).  
This research model also includes a control variable, size of damages (SIZOFDAMAGE), which 
is the amount of compensation paid to policyholders if the risk insured against happens because of 
its potential influence on hidden actions (Chiappori and Salanie 2000, Carlier, Dana, and Shahidi 
2003). 
 
4.3 Development of Research Hypotheses 
Foundation of hypothesis  
This study focuses on the antecedents of hidden action problems and uses the intra-firm buyer-
seller relationship as the main unit to analyse opportunistic behaviour by policyholders within the 
Egyptian car insurance market. The following research hypotheses were developed based on: 1. 
factors relating to the buyer-supplier relationship in the Egyptian car insurance market, 2. literature 
review on PAT and RCT, and 3. insights from preliminary review of the Egyptian car insurance 
market, which provided us with the means to develop the hypotheses. 
This paper has drawn only an initial overview of the possible effects of the independent variables 
on hidden action problems, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, with attention to the four hypotheses (H1, 
H2, H3 and H4) and the control variable to recognize the research problem at a glance.  
Size of damages: In this study, the control variable ‘size of damages’ (SIZOFDAMAGE) 
influences the probability of hidden action problems by measuring the size of the damages to be 
paid against claims by policyholders.  
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Putting in place riders like deductible and co-payment in advance will reduce the amount of 
damages to be paid if the risk insured against actually occurs, so as to avoid the opportunistic 
behaviour referred to as ‘hidden action problems’ from policyholders in this study. Hence, the 
control variable (SIZOFDAMAGE) is expected to positively influence hidden action by 
policyholders (Chiappori and Salanie 2000, Carlier, Dana, and Shahidi 2003) 
Market segment: This chapter focuses its attention on the antecedents and the possible ways of 
attenuating hidden action by car insurance business policyholders, because of their clear effect on 
the financial situation of the Egyptian insurance market. The chapter on data analysis will discuss 
this in detail. However, the ‘trust’ variable should be considered when it comes to business-to-
business policyholders. It plays a pivotal role in such relationships.  
4.3.1 The Association between Information Asymmetry and Hidden Action by Policyholders 
(Hypothesis 1) 
Root of the problem   
Each party to an economic transaction needs detailed and sufficient information and knowledge to 
take accurate decisions, and to achieve the most efficient outcome. However, in the case of 
information asymmetry, one party has more information than the other (Tumay 2009). Information 
asymmetry is regarded as a market failure that adversely affects the level of production and 
consumption, thus affecting market equilibrium. This refers to a situation where one party to a 
transaction has more information or details than the other party does, and might use this 
information to their advantage.  
Information asymmetry  
Information asymmetry refers to a situation where one party to a transaction has information the 
other does not have. If they had this information, the nature of the transaction would have been 
different. Akerlof (1970) first used the industry of used cars to effectively explain the concept of 
information asymmetry in his work on the ‘lemons’ market. In such markets, there are cars of 
different qualities—good ones and bad ones (lemons). This is also very important in the insurance 
industry as their principal product aims to mitigate risks. The prevalence of information asymmetry 
presents a huge challenge to the operations of the insurance market. Asymmetric information leads 
to hidden action problems—a situation wherein one party’s actions can influence the other party 
and hence, the former has an incentive to pursue hidden action to suit his/her self-interests 
(Filipova-Neumann and Welzel 2010). 
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Hidden action in terms of information asymmetry   
This refers to a scenario where products of different qualities are sold at the same price but the 
buyer cannot differentiate between those (Akerlof 1995). However, the insurance market deals 
mainly with the mitigation of risks and losses. It takes on the risks of policyholders and 
compensates them accordingly. Nonetheless, the risks have to be coincidental. However, 
coincidence can be also influenced by human behaviour based on asymmetric information 
regarding their risk levels, which can increase the probability of the risk occurring. The following 
are the possible cases of information asymmetry: 
Policyholders to insurance company: The policyholder has private information about the cars it 
wants to insure or about the conduct/behaviour of the drivers. The insurer does not have this 
information. However, if the insurer has this information, the policyholder will have to pay a higher 
premium to get the policy. Say, a company makes an insurance claim after an accident, but does 
not report the circumstances that surrounded the accident, e.g., speeding or overloading (Rybák 
2015). 
Client  Business customer  
Main insurance product  Fleet/cars 
Basic reason for insurance Assurance of corporate costs and liabilities 
from business operations, assurance of 
corporate revenue and receivables from 
business operations 
Insurance indemnity Compensation for unexpected damage 
Main motivation for fraud Covering of costs 
Risk incurred by realization of insurance 
fraud for insurer 
Risk of excessive payment of claims, solvency 
risk 
Risk incurred by realization of insurance 
fraud for client 
Risk of imprisonment, solvency risk, 
reputation risk 
Source: Motivation for insurance according to client needs (Rybák 2015). 
The table above illustrates a scenario of a business customer with information asymmetry that has 
the potential to increase the level of hidden action problems; the table delineates the dynamics of 
their risk profile and the motivation of buying an insurance product.  
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Examples of some hidden action cases with information asymmetry in the Egyptian car 
insurance sector:  
 Concealment of relevant and material information 
 Wilfully giving false data about the fleet and other factors (age of vehicle, size of risk, 
documents, origin of claim, etc.) 
 Deliberately overstating claims 
 Negligently or carelessly causing damage (car accident, injury) to claim insurance 
 Overpricing assets during the underwriting process and presenting an already-damaged 
product as if it were undamaged (e.g. crashed car) (Rybák 2015) 
Nature of the problem  
This information gap between market players often leads to hidden action problems, which 
normally leads to a positive correlation between the choice of insurance coverage and the 
occurrence claim.  
This prompts insurance companies to charge customers based on their loss probabilities, which 
can lead to cross-subsidization in the loss ratio between high- and low-risk customers (Huang 
2006a). Furthermore, policyholders who have private information about their risk type tend to 
underreport their claim history to insurers—an action taken because of information asymmetry in 
the market, especially by high-risk customers.  
The magnitude to which individuals have knowledge of their risks is a key determinant of their 
willingness to buy insurance and the extent of the coverage they buy. Potential policyholders who 
know that they have low risk have a relatively lower willingness to pay for coverage; this might 
lead to the problem of hidden action and low-risk policyholders getting less than full insurance 
(Olivella and Vera‐Hernández 2013). Marketing relationship is largely characterized by 
information asymmetry: one party to the exchange possesses more information than the other about 
the object of exchange. Many products and services have attributes whose quality can be measured 
only after the services have been bought (Nelson 1970). 
For example, in car repair services, it is hard to determine the quality of the service being offered 
in a transaction. The inability of one party to ascertain the quality can lead to the other acting 
opportunistically by pursuing certain hidden actions. Parties that do not possess the requisite 
quality to provide services might be tempted to misrepresent their ability by making false quality 
claims, which may lead to hidden action problems.  
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This problem presents concerns for parties in an exchange relationship when the object of the 
exchange is hard to ascertain and when the actions are unobservable (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 
1998).  
Tumay (2009) postulated that market participants usually hold information asymmetrically since 
not all actions of players are observable. This leads to hidden action where the party with more 
information self-selects in a way that adversely affects the other party. However, the focus of the 
study is on the ex-post hidden action problem—that is, when one party (policyholder) engages in 
activities that are detrimental to the terms of agreement with the other party (insurer). However, 
information asymmetry often leads to hidden action. 
Consequences of the problem  
When one party undertakes an action that is detrimental to the terms of the agreement, and affects 
the other party because the latter’s actions are largely unobservable after signing of the contract, it 
is considered as information asymmetry. In other words, policyholders will expend less effort on 
self-protection to mitigate the risk after buying the policy, which will increase the likelihood of 
the risk happening and subsequently of the claim, too.  
Hidden action also explains a situation wherein one party in the market cannot observe the actions 
of the other. This occurs when policyholders possessing private information take actions that 
increase the probability of a bad outcome (Filipova-Neumann and Welzel 2010). 
This also refers to a case in which actions pursued by policyholders increase the probability of the 
loss happening but cannot be observed by the insurer. Therefore, the insurer cannot efficiently 
charge the correct premium and indemnify the policyholder based on his/her actual actions. That 
is because his/her actions are hidden and unobservable. This leads to market failure. For example, 
car insurance could make it easier for people to have injuries and property damage by pursuing 
hidden actions, because they will not take care while driving as their car is already insured. Thus, 
the higher the level of information asymmetry, the higher is the likelihood of increased hidden 
actions (Tumay 2009). 
Another consequence of information asymmetry is that the policyholder has an incentive to 
undertake actions that will increase the risk level more than that agreed in the contract. The hidden 
action problem induces them to take more risks once they have secured an insurance coverage 
because they have passed on a huge part of the financial burden to the insurer.  
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It is very expensive and in some cases impractical to put in place effective monitoring mechanism 
to minimize this problem. It is also costly for the insurer to offer incentives that will motivate the 
policyholder to take preventive measures to reduce the loss probability (Arvidsson 2010). 
Solution to information asymmetry  
To mitigate the degree of information asymmetry, the insurer employs a range of screening 
strategies by classifying the various risks using different criteria (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). 
Using this technique, the uninformed party (insurer) uses the available information and trend to 
approximate the accurate picture of the policyholder. To achieve an efficient risk-classification 
outcome, the insurer utilizes the available information and the observable trend that have a strong 
correlation with ex-post risk (Arvidsson 2010).  
In addition, hidden action problems can be solved by offering incentives, which can mitigate poor 
performance and cheating. Another method is to ensure that transactions are arranged in such a 
way that the agent will act in his best interest and pursue activities to the principal’s preference 
even when his/her actions are unobservable.  
Over the years, premiums that exceed the marginal cost of quality have been used as an incentive 
to enhance quality in service provision (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998). A range of incentive 
mechanisms and cultural values manage the hidden action problem and minimize the possibility 
of cheating.  
The major challenge of hidden action problems is that one party can take actions that the other 
cannot monitor efficiently. In the case of insurance contract, the activities of the policyholders 
(agent) affect the level of profitability and the business of the other party, i.e. the insurer 
(principal). Since it is difficult and costly for the insurer to effectively monitor the activities of the 
policyholder ex-post, it is important that the insurer designs a contract that will make the 
policyholder try to not misuse the information gap (Keser and Willinger 2000). 
In addition, Hypothesis (H1) proposes a positive association between asymmetric information and 
hidden action problems. It is assumed that the insurer knows something about a policyholder’s 
characteristics and abilities, but the knowledge about the policyholder’s actions is neither perfect 
nor complete. In contrast, the policyholder has information that the insurer would like to obtain.  
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Such information asymmetries—when one party has information the other desires but does not 
have—characterize most agency relationships. The problem is that self-interest often makes the 
policyholders reluctant to share the information with the insurer. It may even motivate them to 
send the insurer false information (Akerlof 1995). 
H1: The degree of information asymmetry is positively associated with hidden action problems in 
the Egyptian car insurance market. 
4.3.2 The Association between Pre-screening and Hidden Action by Policyholders 
(Hypothesis 2) 
Pre-screening refers to activities undertaken by the insurer to ascertain the material characteristics 
of policyholders after they have signed the contract. It measures the probability of accident and 
the degree of risk aversion between and among customers, with high-risk and low-risk customers 
likely to choose different contracts. Customers are inherently different in their risk profile. 
However, it is difficult for the insurance market to operate as a perfectly competitive one since the 
degree of accident (i.e. loss) probabilities of a potential policyholder cannot be observed ex-ante. 
Thus, certain terms of contract, such as deductibles, may encourage the policyholder to reveal as 
much information as possible in the pre-screening stage before they sign the agreement.  
When the accident probability is the same, low-risk policyholders are more likely to go for lower 
insurance compared with high-risk policyholders (Smart 2000). Insurance uses deductibles and 
policy limit in insurance contracts as a method of multi-dimensional screening to ascertain whether 
potential policyholders have hidden knowledge about the magnitude of their risk, thus minimizing 
the externality of hidden action. When policyholders have tacit knowledge about the likelihood of 
the occurrence of their risks, the market is driven by competition for policyholders in the low-risk 
category. They strive to differentiate themselves from the high-risk policyholders to get favourable 
terms of contract than if they are pooled with high-risk policyholders (Crocker and Snow 2011). 
Risk categorization  
Insurers realize this separation strategy using a screening mechanism where they offer different 
menus of contracts to prospective policyholders. They offer high-risk policyholders a full and fair 
package but with a lower-than-average price of coverage, and possibly the rider of a deductible, 
which is to some extent unacceptable to high-risk policyholders.  
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Thus, effective screening separates the different risk categories. Insurers can achieve this through 
multidimensional screening and the contractual bundling of various risks and possible losses 
(Schumacher 2014).  
Pre-screening and contracting  
Bundled coverage, varying deductibles, and policy limit give an advantage to insurers to screen 
customers in various ways, thus minimizing the externality and the cost borne by low-risk 
policyholders to separate themselves from the high-risk ones. Therefore, insurers can compete 
effectively by using efficient multidimensional screening in their operations (Crocker and Snow 
2011). Netzer and Scheuer (2010) pointed out in their work that policyholders differ largely in 
their risk of incurring a loss; risk categories should be completely separated and high-risk 
customers should buy higher coverage. This implies a positive correlation between risk and level 
of coverage.  
By expanding the Rothschild-Stiglitz screening model to a dynamic setting, they further explained 
that with endogenous wealth creation, high-risk individuals ceteris paribus demonstrate a lower-
than-marginal willingness to pay for insurance coverage compared with low-risk individuals—a 
situation they described as ‘irregular crossing’. The rationale is that given the same contract, high-
risk policyholders exhibit a lower degree of risk aversion and tend to pay a lower cost to protect 
themselves (Netzer and Scheuer 2010).  
Pre-screening in mitigating hidden action  
According to Spinnewijn and Johannes (2013), heterogeneous risk perceptions influence the terms 
of contract offered by insurers since policyholders differ in their risk perception and degree of risk 
aversion. The risk perception of policyholders somewhat determines the willingness to pay for 
insurance and the extent to which they will go to self-protect against the risks, largely influencing 
the design of an insurance contract. However, in extant literature, the focus has been largely on 
the heterogeneity of risks rather than the perception. Since high-risk customers have a greater need 
for insurance, heterogeneity gives rise to the problem of hidden action. As a result, risk and 
coverage are positively correlated and in equilibrium. However, this equilibrium does not really 
hold for many other insurance markets since risk-tolerant policyholders tend to buy less coverage 
and spend less effort and resources in protecting against the risk because of heterogeneous risk 
preference amongst policyholders (Lee 1992).  
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Consequently, the positive correlation between risk and the level of coverage can also be explained 
by the differences in risk perception of the policyholders with regard to the risk itself and his/her 
capacity to effectively manage the risk. Also, screening is a function of the differences in 
perception and the nature of competition in the market (Spinnewijn 2013).  
The level of background risk prevalent in its portfolio can also influence the efficiency of the 
insurance market. The degree of background risk influences policymakers by increasing their level 
of risk aversion. When potential policyholders cannot be effectively screened for background risk, 
the efficiency of the market is affected since high-risk policyholders are free from background risk 
screening (Crocker and Snow 2011). 
In this hypothesis (H2), the researchers expect a negative association between the level of pre-
screening by insurer and hidden action by policyholders. An insurer pre-screens policyholders to 
ascertain whether he/she is sufficiently eligible to obtain a policy. Consequently, the insurer can 
categorize customers based on information about their various risk probabilities obtained at this 
stage. This information is critical as it has a direct positive effect on the eventual claim amount. It 
also gives a vivid picture of the insurance needs of various policyholders and the associated 
premium to be charged. Therefore, the extent and quality of pre-screening can significantly reduce 
the degree of hidden action problems. Thus, ceteris paribus, the insurer is well positioned to 
reasonably determine the possible outcomes of the contractual agreement with such policyholders, 
and as such, minimize the degree of hidden action (Netzer and Scheuer 2010). 
H2: The level of pre-screening is negatively associated with hidden action by policyholders in the 
Egyptian car insurance market. 
4.3.3 The Association between Trust and Hidden Action by Policyholders (Hypothesis 3) 
For a business boom to happen and a successful buyer-supplier relationship to take shape, mutual 
understanding and consistent settlement of exchange partners’ duties and responsibilities are 
important. These could be valuable for creating confidence in the exchange partner, and hence, 
building up trust. In a service industry, such as the insurance industry, where risks and uncertainty 
are increased by one’s inability to evaluate service attributes before those are actually bought, the 
need for trust is of particular importance (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985).  
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Nature and impact of trust in business  
Business relationships such as that between the insurer and the policyholder do not arise overnight. 
It comes through many exchange encounters over time. These encounters may make customers 
take concrete safety measures to alleviate the possibility of a car accident. For instance, they may 
test drivers with breathalysers before the start of work, implement company-specific speed limits, 
give drivers safety and environmental training, etc. Hence, the history of encounters may help 
develop interpersonal and inter-organizational trust between two exchange partners (Heide 1994, 
Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987, Anderson and Weitz 1989).  
Trust may arise from a good relationship between exchange partners, derived from successful past 
buyer-supplier interactions. That is the core indicator of the willingness of an exchange partner to 
rely on its counterpart (Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993). Based on that, the authors argue 
that trust is only applicable to business-to-business relationships. However, the level of trust 
between the insurer and the business policyholder is different from the one between customers, 
depending on the relationship duration, and the size and reputation of the business customer.  
Trust in improving coordination and cooperation in exchange  
According to Burki and Buvik (2010), once trust is established in an exchange relationship, it sets 
a boundary for the permissible behaviour of the partners, and increases tolerance for exchange 
partners’ behaviour (Ganesan 1994, Sharma 1996, Doney and Cannon 1997). Therefore, it defeats 
opportunistic tendencies and minimizes hidden action by policyholders, which is inherent in 
exchange parties. Consequently, it allows them to look out for one another and reduces the gap 
between their objective and preferences. As Anderson and Narus (1990) put it, exchange partners 
are expected to perform actions that enhance positive outcomes for their organizations and do away 
with unexpected actions that may bring forth negative payoffs. According to Heide (1994), inter-
organization trust acts as a form of governance mechanism against opportunism in exchange 
transactions.  
Furthermore, the higher the trust between the insurer and the policyholder, the lower are the hidden 
action problems. Norms and values, which enhance cooperation and lead to relational integration, 
govern the exchange relationship then.  
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Therefore, trust serves as an effective ingredient to attenuate hidden action problems in the 
business relationship as both parties become more accountable and pursue actions that lead to 
favourable outcomes for the preservation of the relationship. On the other hand, if the degree of 
trust between the insurer and the policyholder diminishes, there will be a greater need for 
prevention incentives to motivate the policyholders to protect themselves against the risk. These 
prevention incentives will minimize the probability of the existence of hidden action by the 
policyholder. 
If there is trust, the customers may take concrete safety actions to alleviate possibilities of a car 
accident, for instance, test drivers with breathalysers before the start of work, implement company-
specific speed limits by using speed shooting guns, give drivers safety and environmental training, 
etc. 
This hypothesis (H3) proposes a strong negative association between the levels of trust and hidden 
action by policyholders. The proposed strong negative association follows the argument that trust 
is the product of successful past encounters, that is, the exchange parties are consistently able to 
discharge their responsibilities. The experience makes exchange parties reliable and trustworthy. 
Exchange partners tend to act in a manner that protects the interest of all parties involved in the 
exchange (Heide 1994, Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987, Anderson and Weitz 1989).  
H3: The level of trust between the insurer and policyholders is negatively associated with hidden 
action by the policyholder in the Egyptian car insurance market.  
4.3.4 Interaction Effect 
Self-Protection, Kind of Contract, and Hidden Action by Policyholders (Hypothesis 4) 
 Self-Protection (SELFPROT) 
Self-protection reduces the possibility of hidden actions problems. Insurers can determine a 
policyholder’s risk type by his/her willingness to invest in self-protection, but the investment is 
largely unobservable to them. The private information about the policyholder’s characteristics 
available to the insurer will affect the policyholder’s decision to invest in self-protection, and 
further result in heterogeneous ex-post risk probability.  
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In other words, self-protection is the willingness of the policyholders to exert some effort or incur 
some cost to avoid the risk. That will be reflected in the ex-post risk probability and the frequency 
of accidents (Shavell 1979a, Ehrlich and Becker 1972). 
Examples of self-protection in the Egyptian car insurance market  
Proper maintenance of a car will reduce the probability of an accident. However, when it comes 
to the underwriting process, insurance companies do not use the maintenance record in the 
contractual negotiation. The maintenance record could serve as an investment of self-protection, 
but in this case, it is a hidden action. It is important to consider the fact that investment in self-
protection is rather the decision of individuals than an exogenous factor. However, the incentives 
provided by the insurer and the cost involved can influence it (Huang 2006b).  
Self-protection alone cannot attenuate hidden action problems. In as much as, policyholders are 
motivated by multifarious reasons to pursue effort of self-protection and as such other ways to 
minimize or attenuate hidden action in an exchange relationship should be explored by insurers. 
The degree of self-protection undertaken by policyholders influence the probability of the 
occurrence of an accident. Therefore, as such policyholders should be incentivised and encouraged 
to pursue efforts of self-protection. Consequently, this will go a long way in mitigating the degree 
of hidden action in an exchange relationship. Even though, self-protection alone is not exhaustive 
to fully attenuate the hidden action problems (Lakdawalla and Zanjani 2005).  
With hidden action, the association between the level of the hidden action and the degree of self-
protection does not necessarily need to be positive. The decision of self-protection by one 
policyholder increases the risk probability of another. Therefore, the policyholder who is not 
inclined to pursue self-protection stands out and is considered as high risk by the insurer, compared 
to those who choose to pursue self-protection. Thus leading to externalities; for instance, 
policyholders spending in self-protection will increase the risk of the other policyholders group 
who choose not/cannot to pursue self-protection. Therefore, they will be perceived by the insurer 
as riskier customer group. Thus it is positive for insurer as it makes classification of policyholder 
into high and low risk category and charging appropriately actuarially fair premium.  
Therefore, insurer levy premium and offer product to policyholders based on risk categories and 
policyholders with perceived high risk by the insurer contribute more funds to the pool in premium. 
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Hence, this has the tendency to stimulate self-protection by policyholders as they want to attract 
lower premium and be perceived by the insurer as less risk than they are. Thus creating a pool of 
set of policyholders who spend in self-protection and those who do not. Hence, yielding the insurer 
balance in their portfolio; as one group of policyholders’ activities compensates for the other group 
who do not pursue self-protection.  
This helps insurer categorizes policyholders and offer them the right product with the appropriate 
premiums that is actuarially fair based on the insurer’s perception of their risk profile. 
Consequently, attenuating hidden action and minimizing strain on the insurer’s balance sheet and 
increasing profitability (Lakdawalla and Zanjani 2005).  
The Egyptian case  
Based on the relationship stated above, the Egyptian car insurer has introduced the prevention and 
self-protection mandate, which stipulates that entities requesting car insurance must produce a 
certificate proving that they have taken measures to prevent the risk of car accident before they 
can get a policy. The required documents include a valid car licence, a valid driver’s licence, a 
maintenance certificate, the driver’s health certificate, and a certificate that confirms that the 
information supplied by the policyholder is true and complete. This can be the main reason for the 
existence of the initial self-protection by the policyholder before he/she can obtain the policy 
(Filipova-Neumann and Welzel 2010). 
Prevalence and perception of self-protection in the Egyptian car insurance market 
The Egyptian situation is a bit different in terms of self-protection since many considerations 
influence that issue. Some of these are the nature of the unobservable self-protection measures, the 
type of the customer (business or individual), the driver’s nature regarding risk, his age, and the 
car’s price, its model, and its cost. Policyholders often substitute self-protection measures, which 
are expected to reduce the probability of hidden action or its severity or both, with collectively 
supplied safety programmes. The nature of self-protection as an ‘unobservable’ increases the 
probability that the policyholder will avoid the effort, time and cost involved with the measures. 
The main reason for policyholders in Egypt to avoid self-protection measures is that they know 
that they have full coverage for the risk and there are no incentives for them to spend such cost, 
effort, and time, as the insurer will fully compensate them in the event of an accident (Filipova-
Neumann and Welzel 2010). 
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The case of business policyholders  
If drivers are categorized by age and the tendency to take risk, individuals tend to be more risk 
loving and adventurous compared with business policyholders’ drivers. Actions such as joining 
the races, drinking and driving, or violation of traffic rules can reveal the love for risk. When 
categorized by age, the younger group is more willing to take risks than the more rational older 
group. Business policyholders’ drivers are more averse to taking risks since they have to adhere to 
the rules and regulations of their company. Besides, companies select their drivers carefully, based 
on certain criteria (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). 
Car prices and models also affect the policyholder’s behaviour in favour of self-interest. If the car 
is expensive, the policyholder will take care of it and make more effort to protect it. Egyptian 
insurers provide cover only for car models manufactured over the last six years. The idea is that 
proud of their new cars, people will spend more effort to protect those. One of the most important 
factors that affect investment in self-protection is the cost involved in taking precautions to reduce 
the risk probabilities after buying an insurance product. In other words, the main mechanism that 
influences the degree of willingness of the policyholders to invest in self-protection measures is 
the cost and the impact of the potential accident (Shavell 1979a).   
Business policyholders are more capable than individual ones to invest time, effort and money to 
protect their cars against the potential risks, though the insurer cannot observe the self-protection 
measures. Furthermore, they have more incentive to invest in protecting their cars. Such incentives 
are avoiding the loss of market share, avoiding the damage of their reputation, and avoiding 
discontinuity of operations. Keeping their business going means a lot for the companies (Filipova-
Neumann and Welzel 2010). 
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 Kind of Contract (KINDCONTRAC) 
Kind of contract refers to the nature of contracts agreed upon based on the different products, the 
potential policyholder’s characteristics, and other considerations made by the insurer to determine 
the appropriate contract to offer policyholders based on their peculiarities. The contract clearly 
outlines all technical details, obligations and responsibilities of the parties to it. It also specifies 
the appropriate remedial action to be taken in the event of a breach and how to enforce it. Insurance 
companies adopt two techniques to prevent hidden actions problems—deductible and co-payment 
riders (Schumacher 2014).  
Deductible contract   
A deductible contract refers to a situation where the buyer of an insurance policy is obliged to pay 
the initial damages to a certain limit if the risk insured against happens. If the hazard has a higher 
likelihood of increasing the risk of loss, a deductible is most suitable because this method does not 
only protect the insurer from spending money but significantly reduces the cost involved in 
processing small claims (Tumay 2009, Bakker, van Vliet, and van de Ven 2000). 
The insurer uses the deductible as a screening method to categorize policyholders based on their 
willingness to invest in the frequency of compensations demand, thus inducing individuals to 
reveal the magnitude of their risks. The choice of deductible is principally contingent on the degree 
to which it reduces the premium to be paid. Therefore, a prudent policyholder will consider the 
expected expenses of the policy before deciding to buy it. Under an actuarially fair premium, the 
optimal position for policyholders is to buy full coverage (Dimitriyadis and Öney 2009). 
Co-payment contract 
A co-payment rider is a provision in the policy in which the policyholder has to pay a part of the 
cost if there is a claim. If there is a chance that the degree of hidden action problem will increase 
the claim amount if the risk occurs, co-payment is the most appropriate safeguard for the insurance 
company. The greater the loss of the insured, the larger the co-payment will be. This will offer the 
insured customer the incentive to lower the cost of his/her loss or give an accurate/reasonable 
estimate of it (Tumay 2009). 
47 
 
Co-payment as an effective strategy to attenuate hidden action: Co-payment has proven to be the 
most effective kind of contract to reduce hidden action problem efficiently. Insurers often employ 
it in their agreement with policyholders. In the Egyptian car insurance market, the appropriate cost-
sharing method in the contract will significantly reduce hidden action problems if it is applied to 
the right group of products. Policyholders will then spend on self-protection, e.g. hire qualified 
and experienced drivers, buy monitoring devices, look out for fire problems, follow the agreed 
maintenance schedule, etc. These actions will reduce the likelihood of accidents and the potential 
claim (Qingyue, Liying, and Beibei 2011). 
Nature of insurance contract  
Although insurance contracts are largely standardized, they can be subject to different 
interpretations under different circumstances. However, the terms of the contract must be 
interpreted in a legally sound and socially expedient manner. An insurance policy must be 
construed and enforced based on the principles of the contract; these well-written and 
unambiguous terms must not be modified by a court of laws based on the reasonable expectation 
of the policyholders.  
Interpretation of insurance contracts normally brings out an element of uniformity and possible 
areas of contract disputes. The problem with a strict formalistic interpretative approach is that 
insurance contracts are not normal ordinary contracts negotiated by parties with equal bargaining 
power (Swisher 1996). These are largely adhesion contracts where the insurer has a far superior 
bargaining power compared with the policyholder, who, more often than not, is compelled to 
accept the policy on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In a real-life situation, very few policyholders take 
the time to read and understand the details of the terms binding them in an insurance contract. That 
is why some courts of law use a functional approach in interpreting disputes, seeking to protect 
the reasonable expectations of policyholders from a likely forfeiture of coverage (Swisher 1996). 
To ensure efficiency in utilization of the product, to avoid any financial burden on policyholders, 
and also as an appropriate safeguard for the insurer, most insurance contracts involve cost-sharing 
measures such as co-payment, deductible and coinsurance, or a combination of any two of these. 
These cost-sharing methods have proven to minimize the degree of hidden action problems in the 
car insurance business as policyholders share a certain percentage of the potential damages, which 
is the essence of adopting such contractual terms (Donnelly et al. 2014). 
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Egyptian case  
The presence of hidden action problems in the Egyptian insurance market is pervasive. 
Policyholders hold idiosyncratic information, which increases the probability of their making a 
claim on the policy. For instance, in the automobile market, the insurer will not be able to ascertain 
whether the driver is aggressive or cool while driving. This behaviour tends to increase the 
probability of an accident. In short, policyholders have a huge degree of control on the probability 
of the occurrence of the risk insured against and its magnitude. This, in turn, can increase the 
amount to be paid in damages.  
However, the insurer cannot monitor such activity. This information gap puts the insurer in a 
disadvantage ex-ante and can exacerbate the problem when certain policyholders tend to act 
opportunistically. There is often a strong correlation between the policyholder’s claim and the level 
of insurance coverage. Efficient contracting is essential to combat this anomaly. Co-payment is an 
efficient measure to curb both ex-ante and ex-post hidden action by policyholders and as such 
reduces their degree (Donnelly et al. 2014). 
Rationalization of commonly used contract in the Egyptian car insurance market  
According to Tumay (2009), insurers adopt both deductible and co-payment riders to reduce the 
extent of hidden actions in their business. Deductible contracts are adopted when the likelihood of 
the risk happening is high. These provide an incentive to the insurer to save money to honour 
claims, thereby minimizing the number of claims to be processed, saving time and administrative 
cost in processing claims. On the other hand, co-payment is used when the amount to be potentially 
paid as claims is relatively high. Therefore, the higher the insurer’s loss, the larger is the amount 
of co-payment to be made.  
The effect of self-protection on hidden action in different kinds of contract 
The effect of self-protection on reducing hidden actions of policyholders in different kinds of 
contract has two scenarios; the first scenario when the effect of self-protection on reducing hidden 
actions of policyholders is very high with co-payment car insurance contract. In this situation, the 
policyholders are investing substantial amount of self-protection in order to protect themselves 
against the potential risks, since they know that they will have to share huge portion of the loss; 
and the amount they will share is up to the size of the loss. Therefore, these policyholders have no 
incentives in hidden action as long as they know that they must pay most of the possible damages. 
49 
 
Thus the effect of self-protection on reducing hidden action is very high with co-payment contract 
(Ehrlich and Becker 1972). 
The second scenario when the effect of self-protection on reducing hidden actions of policyholders 
is very low under deductible contract. In this situation, the policyholders are not investing heavily 
in protecting themselves against the potential risks, as they will only incur the initial payment in 
the event of a loss. Despite of that in some cases, the policyholders are investing in self-protection, 
however the insurers think that these policyholders still have incentives for hidden action because 
the contract give them the incentives for the hidden action.  
The reason why they invest in self-protection is that, the policyholders are looking only for an 
economic gain and better business (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). 
Figur 4.2 Moderating Effect of Self-protection on Hidden Action by Policyholders in Different 
Kinds of Contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  Note:             indicates the effect the self-protection has on reducing hidden action  
 
The figure above explains the moderating effect of self-protection on hidden action problems in 
different kinds of contract. Policyholders face varying obligations because of the contractual 
agreement with the insurer. These are mostly either a deductible or a co-payment. Besides, each 
kind of contract depends on the nature of risks and other parameters governing the exchange 
relationship.  
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As shown in figure 4.2, self-protection has very low effect on reducing hidden action when the 
contract kind is deductible. It is so because in an agreement with a deductible, policyholders will 
only honour the initial payment of the loss if the risk insured against happens. Nonetheless, 
policyholders may still allocate a positive amount of his/her wealth as a precautionary measure for 
future income risks, though he/she may pursue self-protection mainly because of the business and 
the profit motive. However, the insurer still believes that this policyholder group has a tendency 
to pursue hidden action as the contract kind provides the incentive for this. Thus, the effect of self-
protection on attenuating hidden action is very low under a deductible contract (Jindapon 2013).  
On the other hand, the effect of self-protection in attenuating hidden action is very high under the 
co-payment contract kind. In it, the policyholder has to share a huge part of the loss, and the amount 
the policyholder will share depends on the size of the loss. The higher the loss, the bigger is the 
amount. As a result, it is expedient for the policyholder to invest in self-protection, leading to 
increased investment in it. Thus, the level of self-protection will be very high and the effect of self-
protection in reducing hidden action will be greater as well. Insurers perceive this policyholder 
group to be genuine and willing to invest in self-protection to avoid paying a huge part of the 
damages. Thus, it serves as a proactive measure to avoid substantial future loss. In short, the effect 
of self-protection on attenuating hidden action problems by policyholders is very high under co-
payment contract and very low for deductible car insurance contract. 
Figur 4.3 Matrix of Self-protection, Kind of Contract and Hidden Action Problems by 
Policyholder 
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Cell 1: This represents a situation wherein the kind of contract offered to the policyholder is a 
deductible. This normally happens when policyholders do not adhere to the contractual obligations 
to mitigate the risks from happening, thus increasing hidden action problems. However, in the 
event of any damages, the policyholder will only make the initial payment and the insurer will 
cover the rest of the liability. Hence, policyholders may be reluctant to invest significantly in self-
protection, especially if the cost involved is prohibitive.  
Since he/she does not get an additional value/incentive for incurring the cost to mitigate the risks, 
he/she will not spend substantially on any preventative measure to reduce the burden on the insurer. 
This increases the level of hidden action problems because the insurer cannot proactively monitor 
the policyholders for compliance (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). 
Cell 2: This refers to a case where a deductible contract is used and the probability of the risk 
occurring and the level of hidden action are both high. Therefore, any self-protection measure 
adopted by the policyholder is to serve his/her self-interest and not necessarily to reduce hidden 
action. The policyholder has no genuine incentive to take self-protection measures because the 
contract kind does not attenuate hidden action.  
However, in the case of car insurance, some companies in Egypt invest heavily in self-protection 
(e.g., maintaining schedule, investing in tracking devices, hiring experienced and qualified drivers, 
etc.) since an accident might be disastrous for their business. It will affect their service quality, 
interrupt production and business, reduce their market share, and adversely affect profitability. 
Purely from a business standpoint, they deem it prudent to invest in self-protection measures, and 
not necessarily because they have bought an insurance policy. Thus, their action is a positive 
externality for the insurer (Jindapon 2013). 
Cell 3: This represents co-payment, which has been found to be very effective in minimizing 
hidden actions, as the policyholder’s share of payment will increase with the loss. In this scenario, 
the level of co-payment is low, and thus, does not significantly lead to an increase in hidden 
actions. Policyholders may still adopt safety measures like installing anti-lock braking system, 
tracking devices, and alarms, and drive carefully. This does not necessarily reduce the degree of 
hidden actions by policyholders and imposes a huge financial constraint on the insurer.  
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That is because the co-payment to be made is low in this case. The reserve ratio and profitability 
will decrease because the volume and frequency of compensation will increase dramatically in this 
situation (Lee 1992). 
Cell 4: This represents a scenario with a higher co-payment, which serves as an attenuation of 
hidden action problems. Policyholders will take self-protect measures to minimize the possibility 
of accidents, as they will also incur huge losses if the risk occurs, because the degree of co-payment 
increases with the amount of loss. Hence, self-protection is valuable to this customer group. The 
insurer believes that these policyholders have little or no motivation for hidden action since they 
have to pay a substantial part of any loss suffered.  
Thus, high self-protection leads to utmost good faith and the belief that the policyholder is genuine 
and has integrity. Hence, it serves as an attenuation of hidden action. To avoid jeopardizing their 
business and a financial situation that might have far-reaching implications for it, policyholders 
tend to invest in self-protection as a proactive measure. They try to avoid potential higher losses 
in future, because if an accident occurs, their businesses will not be operational and meet its 
obligations. At the same time, because of the co-payment contract clause, they will be highly liable 
for a larger share of any loss (Qingyue, Liying, and Beibei 2011).  
Simply put, the main reason behind hidden action is the cost involved in taking precautions and 
taking care to avoid a potential risk. When policyholders are fully insured, they have no reason to 
incur such costs since their insurance will cover the loss (Tumay 2009). 
Relationship between self-protection and hidden action in different kinds of contract: ‘Kind of 
contract’ refers to the different agreements (mostly deductible and co-payment) insurers have with 
policyholders based on the latter’s peculiarities and risk profile. Thus, the degree of self-protection 
to attenuate hidden action depends on the different kinds of contracts. Policyholders tend to spend 
genuinely on self-protection to attenuate hidden action if the contract type (co-payment) transfers 
some obligations to them. To mitigate any potential burden in the event of a loss, they invest in 
self-insurance, though the insurer cannot monitor their actions completely. Thus, self-protection 
influences the degree of hidden action problems in different kinds of contract (Qingyue, Liying, 
and Beibei 2011). 
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On the other hand, if the kind of contract is deductible, the insurer believes that the policyholders 
still have incentive to pursue actions that can increase the degree of hidden action. That is because 
the contract type is insufficient to prevent hidden action and provides an incentive for the 
policyholders to shirk responsibility (hidden action); it is more beneficial for them. Nonetheless, 
some business policyholders still invest hugely in self-protection to avoid disruption in production 
and operations because that would have huge implications for their business. However, the insurer 
still believes that the customers in this contract group pursue hidden actions since the contract type 
creates room for that. They might also under/over-report accidents when those occur (Ehrlich and 
Becker 1972).  
Finally, in this study, hypothesis four (H4) deals with the interaction between self-protection by 
policyholders, the kind of contract they sign, and how it influences their hidden action. This study 
expects larger negative association between self-protection and hidden action of policyholders for 
co-payment contract than for deductible contract based on the reasoning that, When the insurers 
consider policyholders with a co-payment contract who increase their self-protection, insurers 
think that this will reduce their opportunism. The insurers will think that these policyholders have 
nothing to hide.  
The insurers know that these policyholders will do self-protection just to reduce possible accidents 
because the policyholders must pay a high price whenever an accidents happen. Hence, self-
protection is very valuable for this customer group. The insurers think that these policyholders 
have low self-interests in hidden action as long as they must pay most of the possible damages. 
Thus, high self-protection in this contract group is a signal to the insurers that the policyholders 
are serious and truthful in the exchange. Therefore, this study expects a strong negative association 
between self-protection and hidden action under co-payment car insurance contract. 
On the other hand, when the insurers consider policyholders with deductible contract and increased 
self-protection, the insurance companies think that these policyholders still have incentives to shirk 
because the contract still give incentives for shirking (hidden action) because of high 
compensations. The reason why policyholders then increase self-protection? Just, to run their 
business better and have fewer accidents. The insurers, however, still think that these contract 
group still will have the incentive to shirk when a real accident occurs (Shogren and Crocker 2004).  
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Following the foregoing discussions and reasoning, the authors hypothesize that: 
H4: The association between self-protection and hidden action by policyholder is more negatively 
shaped for co-payment contracts compared with deductible contracts.  
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter presented an overview of the conceptual model of this study. The authors used the 
literature review on PAT and RCT discussed in the preceding chapter to develop the research 
model and formulate the hypotheses. They developed four hypotheses based on the conceptual 
model; three represent the hypothesized main effect and the fourth, interaction effects. 
Furthermore, they also presented a discussion on the control variable. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology relevant to this study. It gives a glance into the research 
design and data collection methods. It also discusses and shows survey instrument development 
and sampling procedures. Furthermore, it describes the data collection techniques and procedures 
adopted in this study. 
 
5.2 Research Design 
Research design involves the procedures for executing a research. It clears the path for data 
collection and analysis. A research deals with a wide range of decisions, the principal among these 
being the choice of design to adopt for the study. Different methods and approaches can be 
adopted, which are largely determined by the nature of the research problem to be addressed, the 
personal experiences of the researcher, and the audiences for which the work is intended (Clark 
and Creswell 2014). 
Research design is used as a basis for planning, implementation, and analysis of a study. It enables 
the researchers to address the research questions and hypothesis. However, the research design 
adopted is a function of the type of research questions and the hypothesis to be addressed. Most 
studies adopt a mix of both quantitative and qualitative research design techniques to carry out 
studies (Sousa, Driessnack, and Mendes 2007).  
Research design can be further divided into exploratory and conclusive research. Exploratory 
research deals with exploring a certain aspect of the topic without necessarily drawing a 
conclusion. Conclusive research can be further divided into descriptive and causal. Descriptive 
research delineates specific causes, activities, and relationships in the research; causal mainly 
studies cause-and-effect relationships (Keyvani, Sasani, and Mirzaei 2014). This study adopted a 
few qualitative aspects as well as some quantitative aspects of research design. In the preliminary 
stages, qualitative aspects were adopted, where the authors conducted face-to-face interviews with 
a few key informants and stakeholders in the Egyptian insurance industry.  
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To gain more insight into the research problem, the authors sought information from 
representatives of insurance companies. To develop questions reflecting the industry’s current 
practice, it was important for the authors to gather the information through discussions with key 
informants. In the next stages, the main research design of this study involves carrying out 
informed cross-sectional design using quantitative aspects. To test the association between 
dependent and independent variables, this study has adopted a cross-sectional and correlational 
design, because cross-sectional design is appropriate for establishing the degree of association 
between variables (Busk 2005). 
 
5.3 Data Collection 
The authors collected primary and secondary data to test the hypotheses and to address the research 
problem scientifically. Primary data represents a data collection technique wherein the researcher 
could gather data first-hand from the Egyptian insurance industry. Secondary data represents the 
data collected from published reports through desk reviews. Thus, the authors collected primary 
data through questionnaires. The biggest six insurance companies in Egypt were approached, and 
requested to fill in the questionnaires. Yin (2013) pointed out that a questionnaire may be 
administered in different ways, such as mail, fax, on the telephone, or in person (Yin 2013, Crano, 
Brewer, and Lac 2014). 
Secondary data has played a critical role in this study to provide the infrastructure to establish a 
proper theoretical framework, and therefore, create the best conceptual model utilized herein. Such 
data is considered very important for giving a glance into the conceptual foundation and the 
relevant theoretical framework, besides going deeply into studying the nature of the Egyptian 
insurance industry. The authors gathered secondary data from literary sources such as scholarly 
journals, books, theses, conference papers, and documents and reports from the ministries of 
insurance, and finance and economy, and regulatory authorities such as EFSA, insurance 
associations such as EISA, MOSI, NASI, NIB, PIO, SIFGE, SIFPPSE, SIO, SIS, the Central 
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, and other web-based sources. They developed the 
theoretical framework for this study and corroborated the empirical findings based on these 
sources. 
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5.3.1 Population, Sampling Frame, Sample Size and Sampling Procedures 
Brewer (2014) defined population as the total number of cases that belong and conform to some 
particular or designated specifications. There are two investigations for obtaining the population 
parameters—a census and a sample survey. Most technical sampling literatures distinguished 
between the two. Census is an investigation containing all the potential identities that could pertain 
to the target population (the universe of interest). A sample survey refers to a subset of worthy 
identities in a population (Crano, Brewer, and Lac 2014).  
According to Brewer (2014), there are five steps in sampling design. These are: (a) defining the 
universe or population of interest, (b) defining the sampling unit within the population of interest, 
(c) preparing the list of all the items within the population of interest, (d) determining the sample 
size, and (e) deciding on the technique of sampling. All registered and licensed insurance 
companies in Egypt represent the population in this study. A report obtained from the Egyptian 
Financial Supervisory Authority (2014) revealed that there were 32 insurance companies in the 
country in that year ((EFSA) 2014b). The majority of these companies are located in Cairo, with 
branches in different cities of Egypt. 
 Sampling Frame   
Brewer (2014) defined a sampling frame as a listing of the population of interest, from which units 
of that population are drawn and used as the sample for a study. The sampling frame for this study 
consisted of 32 registered and licensed insurance companies ((EFSA) 2014b) located in Cairo. 
According to Henry (1990), sampling can be classified as random or non-random. Random 
sampling uses a random mechanism to obtain a sample that is intended to be representative of the 
underlying population. Random samples can be gathered in different ways, including simple 
random sampling, systematic sampling, cluster sampling, stratified sampling, and multistage 
sampling.  
Furthermore, random sampling is also known as probability sampling because every member of 
the population has a chance to be included in the sample, though the probability of every member’s 
selection may not be equal.  
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Non-random sampling uses a non-random mechanism to obtain a sample from a population. Non-
random samples are gathered based on convenience, through approaches such as snowball 
sampling or quota sampling. In non-random sampling, also known as non-probability sampling, 
members are selected from a population that cannot be determined due to unavailability of a 
sampling frame listing the potential respondents or locations. Using random sampling approaches 
will produce higher external validity than using non-random approaches (Crano, Brewer, and Lac 
2014).  
Thus, this study employed a simple random sampling technique whose underlying assumption was 
that every member of the population in question had an equal and non-zero probability of being 
selected every time a unit was drawn for inclusion in the sample (Crano, Brewer, and Lac 2014). 
It was used to select a representative sample from the sampling frame of 32 insurance companies.  
 Sample Size   
The samples for this study were obtained randomly from among non-life insurance companies in 
Cairo to measure the antecedents of hidden action. However, there is generally no consensus on 
the right sample size to use in a given study. A range of factors, such as the purpose of the study, 
population size, and the magnitude of the acceptable sampling error, determine it. Three criteria 
must be determined to ascertain the appropriate sample size in a study—the level of precision the 
study wants to achieve, the confidence interval, and the degree of variability of the attributes being 
measured (Israel 1992). The ultimate goal of fully representing the population and the design of 
the study may not completely reside on the collected sample’s size, but on the quality of the 
samples (Lenth 2001). 
As highlighted above, this study has used a randomly selected sample of insurers in Cairo, which 
houses major insurance companies. A study design has four inter-related features. The sample size 
is one of these features, which can influence the detection of significant differences, relationships 
or interactions (Peers 2006). However, extant literature does not provide a clear description of how 
to determine the appropriate sample size. Denscombe (2014) pointed out that in the case of large-
scale surveys using probability sampling, the calculation of an appropriate sample size will depend 
on four things—the size of the research population, the accuracy of the estimates, the level of 
confidence, and the variation (Denscombe 2014). 
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Nevertheless, different authors have suggested different thumb rules. For instance, Boomsma 
(1982) recommended a reasonable sample size of 100 or 200 elements when using the structural 
equation model (SEM). Bentler and Chou (1987) and Bollen (1989) suggested a sample size of 
five or 10 observations per estimated parameter. Nunnally (1967) suggested that a sample should 
have a ratio of 10 observations per variable or construct.  
This study has seven variables or constructs; thus, the minimum sample based on Nunnally’s 
criterion (1967) is 7x10 = 70. Nonetheless, the authors targeted 75 respondents to gather adequate 
representative responses that would be fit for factor analysis. 
5.3.2 Questionnaire Development and Data Collection Techniques   
 Questionnaire Development   
The authors used an extensive and rigorous literature review to develop all latent constructs and 
their corresponding constituent measurement variables. Moreover, the supervisor was a critical 
factor in the survey-instrument-development process. Argument and criticism from the 
experienced researcher were useful for the clarity, completeness, and adequacy of measurement 
variables as recommended by (Bergdahl et al. 2007, Forza 2002). To get more insight into the 
insurance industry domain and to clarify the nature of the research problem, the authors conducted 
face-to-face interviews in the initial phase. 
These interviews equipped the authors well to determine the variables that were relevant, useful, 
and critical to this study. Furthermore, these allowed the authors to utilize similar constructs used 
in previous researches by fitting them to the context of the Egyptian car insurance industry. Before 
starting data collection, the questionnaire was pre-tested for content validity (Cade et al. 2002, 
Alaimo, Olson, and Frongillo 1999). Respondents were asked to pre-review the questionnaire’s 
structure, ambiguity, completeness, and readability as (Dillman 1978)) recommended.  
Valuable information was gathered from the respondents—who were managers in their respective 
companies—to correct obscure and inappropriate vocabulary, as (Dias, Rajan, and Thompson 
2008) have recommended. The feedbacks from the experienced researcher and practitioners were 
incorporated to develop the final questionnaire, which was in English. However, it was translated 
into Arabic, and the data collection process was also done in Arabic.  
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The collected data was then translated into English (see Appendix 1). The respondents were 
requested to grade all items using a seven-point Likert scale, anchored from 1=‘strongly disagree’ 
to 7=‘strongly agree’, with regard to one of their most recent cases of insurance compensation to 
business policyholders.  
To conclude, the survey instrument in this study consisted of three main parts. The first was to 
collect background information of the insurers (respondents) and their main policyholders. The 
second was to use a multi-item, seven-point Likert scale anchored from 1=‘strongly disagree’ to 
7=‘strongly agree’, which was created to measure the relevant constructs in the study. The third 
part used single-item measures for general questions—both open-ended and closed-ended—which 
were designed to infer the various aspects of the relationship between the insurers and their 
policyholders. 
 Data-Collection Procedures and Techniques  
The key data-collection technique adopted in this study was the one suggested by (Watt and Van 
den Berg 1995). The rule followed for the exploratory study herein confirmed that general 
managers, operation managers, compensation department managers, information system 
managers, and screening department managers have the first responsibility to deal with 
policyholders. 
Therefore, these managers are knowledgeable enough about the relationship between the focal 
firm (insurer) and partner firms (policyholders), and hence, are well qualified to be the key 
informants. The main tool for data collection in this study was a survey with a questionnaire. As 
Yin (2013) pointed out, a questionnaire may be administered in different ways, such as mail, fax, 
on the telephone, or even in person through face-to-face interview. In this study, questionnaires 
were administered in person through face-to-face interviews.   
This method was chosen because questionnaires by mail were likely to get a very low response 
rate, as the information system infrastructure in Egypt is poorly developed. The questionnaire 
comprised 59 questions, which would make putting them through telephone calls very costly. The 
associated cost and the length of the questionnaire would possibly have resulted in a very low 
response rate.  
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One of the authors visited a sample of Egyptian insurance companies from 17 January 2016 to 25 
February 2016. The sample comprised six of the biggest insurance companies in Egypt, 
specifically in Cairo. The author conducted face-to-face interviews with the general managers, 
operations managers, compensation department managers, information system managers, and 
screening department managers, who were supposed to have sufficient knowledge and experience 
about the relationship with their policyholders. The questions were about the most recent insurance 
compensation cases by business policyholders.  
All the informants assisted with the filling in of the questionnaires according to every 
specialization of their department, as contact was established with them beforehand. The author 
started with a seminar about the research problem to give the informants a brief idea about the 
most important points to be analysed with respect to the research problem as well as to explain the 
importance of the research for their industry and how to fill in the questionnaire. Thus, for every 
insurance-compensation case between the insurer and the business policyholders, there was a face-
to-face interview between the author and the aforementioned informants, where every insurer filled 
in eight to 11 questionnaires.  
 Response Rate   
All the informants were asked to identify the most recent insurance compensation cases with 
business policyholders and then relate all the subsequent questions about the relationship with this 
policyholder (see Appendix 1). The response rate for this study was 84%, as 63 responses could 
be collected out of the targeted 75. The technique embraced for data collection—the 
questionnaire—got a high response rate through face-to-face interview. One of the most important 
techniques that led to an increase in the response rate was the seminars that the author conducted 
with every respondent to give him/her a synopsis of the nature of the research problems and the 
purpose of the study. Face-to-face interview was chosen because it yields a high response rate 
(Ryu, Couper, and Marans 2006). 
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5.4 Summary  
This chapter presented and discussed the methodology used in this study. It also discussed the 
main research strategy of this study, which followed the cross-sectional quantitative design. 
Furthermore, it presented data collection procedures and techniques, and questionnaire 
development. The next chapter discusses the descriptions and operationalization of the primary 
latent constructs used in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
OPERATIONALIZATION AND DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
OPERATIONALIZATION AND DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces a measurement model suitable for this study. It defines and elaborates 
different constructs and their respective measures. Hidden action, self-protection, asymmetric 
information, pre-screening, and trust are operationalized as perceptual items on a seven-point 
Likert scale, while kind of contract and size of damage are measured as non-perceptual items on a 
single-item scale. However, the authors have adopted some measurement items from previous 
research and modified those to fit the context of this work. 
 
6.2 Measurement 
The foundation of scientific inquiry is measurement. Theoretical concepts must be observed at the 
operational level to test the hypothesis. In other words, all that has been defined should be 
accurately and justifiably measured. However, measurement has different levels; every level 
provides differing amounts of information regarding the theoretical constructs in this study. 
However, some basic issues must be addressed to achieve adequacy of measurement (Watt and 
Van den Berg 1995). Accordingly, this study has developed and operationalized all constructs 
based on the recommendations of Churchill (1979), which provide the guidelines for designing the 
measures of constructs used in a study.  
Considering such recommendations, this study also reviewed existing literature extensively to 
capture the ambit of the constructs used to formulate the hypotheses. Additionally, some 
measurement items were gleaned from previous researches, which were modified and adapted to 
fit the context of this study. Multi-item scales were used to operationalize constructs such as hidden 
action, self-protection, asymmetric information, pre-screening, and trust. The rest of the variables, 
such as the size of damages and kind of contract, were operationalized using single-item scales. 
Arora (2013) postulated that measurement (or observation) is the process of recording and 
determining the possible traits of a variable, which an individual case possesses or exhibits. The 
variable ‘kind of contract’ has two possible traits—co-payment and deductible—and measurement 
involves deciding which of these two categories a given car insurance contract falls in and has the 
biggest effect on reducing hidden action.  
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During the process of measurement, a range of scores (also called points on the scale), which can 
be assigned to cases, should be specified through a scale of measurement (Arora 2013). Many 
researchers will always consider the need to develop new questionnaires/scales to test and develop 
theory. They would consider alternative scaling formats to minimize the possibility of having a 
great variance by using the common methods. This is known to be true in a wide variety of research 
contexts (e.g., (Williams and Zipser 1989)). Minimizing the variance could enhance both theory 
development and testing. Furthermore, where issues of response bias, time, ease of development, 
and participant fatigue are substantial, it would be more appropriate to develop one or a few 
elaborate questionnaires than go for the standard five or more Likert-type items (Russell, Weiss, 
and Mendelsohn 1989, Gardner et al. 1998).  
Furthermore, with regard to predictive validity, multi-item scales clearly outperform single-item 
ones. Single-item scales perform equally well as multi-item ones do, but only under very specific 
conditions. Therefore, the use of single-item measures in empirical research should be limited to 
special circumstances, and their use should be approached with caution (Diamantopoulos et al. 
2012, Buvik and Grønhaug 2000, Buvik and Haugland 2005, Rokkan and Buvik 2003). As De 
Vellis (2012) pointed out, poor measurement will undermine the validity of the conclusion of a 
research. Therefore, to foster a better research conclusion, the measurement process should be 
carried out well from the beginning (DeVellis 2012). 
 
6.3 Measurement Model 
Management scholars often identify structural relationships among latent, unobserved constructs 
through statistically-related covariation between the observed variables and the latent constructs 
or indicators of the latent constructs (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and Van Heerden 2003, 2004). This 
permits scholars to argue that if variation in a latent construct B is associated with variation in 
indicator A, the exogenous interferences that can change B can be revealed in A. Most scholars 
assume this relationship between construct and indicator to be reflective. In other words, the 
change in the latent construct B is reflected by the change in A; causality flows from the latent 
construct to the indicator with regard to reflective measurement models (Coltman et al. 2008).  
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However, not all latent constructs are entities that can be measured with a battery of positively 
correlated items (Bollen and Lennox 1991, Edwards and Bagozzi 2000, Fornell and Bookstein 
1982). An uncommon but equally plausible approach is a formative or causal index that can 
combine several indicators to form a construct without any assumptions about the patterns of inter-
correlation between these items. A formative or causal index results (Centore 1968, 
Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001, Edwards and Bagozzi 2000) when causality flows in a 
direction opposite to reflective measurement models—from the indicator to the construct. The 
formative measurement model view is common in economics and sociology. However, the 
reflective measurement model view dominates psychological and management sciences (Coltman 
et al. 2008).  
Assigning meaningful relationships to the structural model requires proper specification of a 
measurement model. Therefore, the distinction between formative and reflective measures is very 
important (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Structural equation modelling (Baumgartner and 
Homburg 1996, Chin and Todd 1995, Shook et al. 2004) and theoretical work in construct validity 
(Blalock 1991, DeVellis 2012, Edwards and Bagozzi 2000) reinforce the understanding. However, 
to achieve construct validity, a working researcher should follow some procedures, though 
considerable debate exists regarding those (e.g., (Diamantopoulos 2005, Finn and Kayande 2005)). 
Thus, this study has operationalized all constructs as latent variables, where all variables have been 
measured as reflective scales (see Appendix 3). 
Figure 6.1 Measurement Models: (a) Reflective Model and (b) Formative Model 
 
Source: Diamantopoulos (1999)   
(b) 
(a) 
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6.4 Measurement Process 
In this section, all variables will be defined and all question items that make up a particular latent 
construct, listed. Hidden action by policyholder (HIDDENACT) represents the dependent variable 
in this study while self-protection (SELFPROT), kind of contract (KINDCONTRAC), asymmetric 
information (ASYMMINFO), pre-screening (PRESCREEN) and trust (TRUST) represent 
independent variables. There is one control variable—size of damages (SIZEDAMAGE).  
 
6.4.1 The Dependent Variable 
 Hidden Action (HIDDENACT) 
The dependent variable, hidden action by policyholders, is influenced by the above-mentioned 
independent variables. The authors composed questions on this latent construct based on the 
literature review (e.g. (Caillaud and Hermalin 2000, Rauchhaus 2005, Guesnerie 1989)) besides 
the practical data gathered in the initial stage of the data-collection process. The construct is made 
up of six items anchored from 1=‘strongly disagree’ to 7=‘strongly agree’. Therefore, the 
following items were used to measure hidden action by policyholders, as perceived by the insurer. 
 
HIDDENACT 1 This policyholder sometimes does not adhere to the commitment to use his 
cars for the purpose agreed upon in the insurance policy in order to get 
different incentives from my company. He uses his cars for purposes other 
than that mentioned in the policy. 
HIDDENACT 2 When an accident occurs, this policyholder claims a huge (abnormal) amount 
of damages from my company. 
HIDDENACT 3 When an accident occurs, this policyholder does not inform my company on 
time. He does it later, which is against the terms of the contract. 
HIDDENACT 4 This policyholder sometimes makes false promises and claims regarding the 
maintenance of the cars, for which he does not go to the original brand centre 
or the approved garages, as specified in the agreement.   
HIDDENACT 5 This policyholder occasionally lies or makes misleading assertions regarding 
buying/hiring safety devices and parking his cars in proper garages, which 
was a prerequisite ex-ante the contract approval.  
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HIDDENACT 6 This policyholder sometimes does not report violation of traffic rules by his 
drivers or carelessness or reckless behaviour on their part, leading to an 
accident or to an increase in the chance of it.  
 
6.4.2 The Independent Variables 
 Self-protection (SELFPROT) 
Self-protection as a latent construct was measured using a 7-point Likert scale, anchored from 
1=‘strongly disagree’ to 7=‘strongly agree’. This construct was made up of 10 items selected by 
the authors based on the literature review (e.g. (Dionne and Gagné 2002, Winter 2000b, Huang, 
Liu, and Tzeng 2010)) and the practical data gathered in the initial stage of the data-collection 
process.  
 
SELFPROT 1 This policyholder never leaves the car unlocked. 
SELFPROT 2 This policyholder never leaves the car engine running. 
SELFPROT 3 This policyholder never leaves the car with a window/the roof open. 
SELFPROT 4 This policyholder never allows another person to drive the car without the 
insurer’s permission. 
SELFPROT 5 This policyholder never crosses the state borders in the car, against the 
domestic insurance policy.  
SELFPROT 6 This policyholder always follows traffic rules. 
SELFPROT 7 The drivers of this policyholder’s firm never drive the cars without using the 
seatbelt. 
SELFPROT 8 This policyholder always parks his cars in private locked garages equipped 
with anti-lock system. 
SELFPROT 9 The policyholder never gets some parts of the cars repaired during 
maintenance without the insurer’s permission. 
SELFPROT 10 The drivers of this firm never break the speed limit while driving the cars. 
 
 
 
70 
 
 Asymmetric information (ASYMMINFO) 
The authors made this construct based on the literature review (e.g. (Dahlby 1992, Anderson and 
Moore 2006, Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998, Cohen and Siegelman 2010, Spindler, Winter, and 
Hagmayer 2014)) and the practical data gathered in the field during the initial data-collection 
process. It comprises six items, which were anchored on a seven-point Likert scale from 
1=‘strongly disagree’ to 7=‘strongly agree’. 
 
ASYMMINFO 1 It is very difficult for our company to know/verify whether the policyholder’s 
drivers have driven under the influence of alcohol/drugs. 
ASYMMINFO 2 It is very difficult for our company to know/verify whether this policyholder 
has hired unqualified drivers. 
ASYMMINFO 3 It is very difficult for our company to know/verify whether this policyholder 
has given correct information about the daily working hours of the car. 
ASYMMINFO 4 It is very difficult for our company to get exact or accurate information about 
whether this policyholder has adhered to the specified load capacity. 
ASYMMINFO 5 It is very difficult for our company to know/verify whether this policyholder 
left the car with keys/fobs attached to the switch. 
ASYMMINFO 6 It is very difficult for our company to get exact or accurate information about 
whether this policyholder has used the car for purposes other than that 
mentioned in the insurance policy. 
 
 Pre-screening (PRESCREEN) 
This construct is made up of six items anchored from 1=‘strongly disagree’ to 7=‘strongly agree’. 
The authors selected the measurement items based on the literature review (e.g., (Reichheld and 
Teal 2001, Rauchhaus 2009, Landes 2013, Camp 2004) coupled with the practical data gathered 
during the initial data-collection process.  
 
PRESCREEN 1 Before we signed the contract, we confirmed that this policyholder fulfilled the 
specific number of kilometres to get the insurance policy. 
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PRESCREEN 2 Before we signed the contract, we confirmed that this policyholder met the age 
requirement of the car (6 years) to get the insurance policy. 
PRESCREEN 3 Before we signed the contract, we confirmed that the cars of this policyholder 
had no record of a collision or a serious accident. 
PRESCREEN 4 Before we signed the contract, we checked that this policyholder provided the 
required documents, such as the traffic certificate, and met other regulatory 
requirements. 
PRESCREEN 5 Before we signed the contract, we checked that this policyholder kept regular 
maintenance record. 
PRESCREEN 6 Before we signed the contract, we confirmed that this policyholder has hired 
insured motorists. 
 
 Trust (TRUST) 
This construct was measured using a seven-point Likert scale, anchored from 1=‘strongly disagree’ 
to 7=‘strongly agree’. This construct comprises seven items adapted from (Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp 1995, Morgan and Hunt 1994, Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993, Ganesan 
1994). 
TRUST 1 This policyholder fulfils the promises it makes to our company regarding 
actions or effort of self-protection. 
TRUST 2 We trust that this policyholder follows the guidelines of our formal 
agreements. 
TRUST 3 Our company trusts that this policyholder provides complete and accurate 
information. 
TRUST 4 Our company considers this policyholder friendly and trustworthy because of 
his truthfulness in previous dealings. 
TRUST 5 Going by his/her previous actions and activities, I trust that this policyholder’s 
future decisions and actions will not adversely affect our company. 
TRUST 6 This policyholder has high levels of integrity and honesty with regard to my 
company’s business dealings. 
TRUST 7 This policyholder always keeps the promises it makes to our company 
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 Kind of contract (KINDCONTRAC) 
This construct is dichotomous and categorical. It was operationalized as a single-item scale 
adapted from previous research by (Chiappori and Salanié 2002, Winter 1992, Barr 2010, Doherty 
and Mahul 2001). The construct was measured by a single open-ended question: 
 
What kind of contract does your company prefer to eliminate hidden action problems? 
(a) Deductible (b) Co-payment (c) Others (mention) ------------------------ 
 
 Size of damages (SIZDAMAGE) 
This construct was operationalized as a single-item scale, adapted from previous research by 
(García Rubiano 2009, Barr 2010, Huang 2006b). This construct was measured as a natural 
logarithm of the total annual dollar value a particular insurer paid for the number of claims received 
from one of its policyholders. This construct was measured by a single open-ended question: 
 
In terms of monetary value, how much did your company pay this policyholder during the last 
financial year against the claims received? $ -------------------- 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter defined all constructs used in this study and accordingly, determined their respective 
measures. Furthermore, it discussed measurement and operationalization of variables. It presented 
question items for both the dependent variable and the independent variables and evaluated the 
measurement models. The next chapter will deal with detailed presentation and discussion of the 
tests of validity and reliability.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DATA EXAMINATION AND DATA VALIDATION 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides details of the assessment of the data collected to ascertain the degree of 
quality and the validation that the authors could use it as a basis of analysis for this study. The 
authors performed a series of descriptive statistical analyses to ensure that they could achieve the 
fundamental assumptions to run the regression analysis successfully, thus confirming linearity and 
normality in the dataset. Furthermore, the authors performed a scale and reliability test along with 
factor analyses for this study. 
 
7.2 Data Screening and Cleaning 
7.2.1 Data Assessment, Cleaning and Screening Process for Missing Data 
The authors checked and verified that no data in the dataset was missing and the available data 
was correct. In all, 63 questionnaires were duly and comprehensively completed. This success rate 
can be attributed to the data-collection method. The questionnaires were administered in person 
and the respondents had to complete and return those. A seminar was also conducted to give the 
respondents a synopsis of the study, which gave them an idea of the research problem. This 
proactive measure made them fully aware of the issue and their responses were adequate and 
reliable for the purpose of the study.  
7.2.2 Assessment of Outliers, Skewness, and Kurtosis for Normality Check 
The next step was to check for outliers and skewness to avoid incompatibility and extreme values 
in the results. An outlier is defined as an observation that is inconsistent with the other observations 
in the dataset. There is a very low probability that it emanates from the same and equal statistical 
distribution of the remaining observations under consideration in the dataset, thus affecting the 
statistical outcome (Walfish 2006). It is a data point significantly different from the rest of the 
dataset. It is also called an abnormality, deviant, and anomaly when one or more processes generate 
it. 
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Generation of certain datasets acts in an unusual way, leading to the generation of outliers 
(Aggarwal 2015). However, most real-world data have some degree of outliers, which may be of 
big or small values different from the rest of the dataset. These adversely affect data analysis—
such as ANOVA and regression, based on the distribution assumption—and might provide very 
important insights into the data of a given study. Outliers can be a result of incorrect data 
measurement, erroneous data entry, or incompatible dataset. Thus, recognizing and detecting 
outliers are an essential and integral part of data analysis (Seo 2006). 
On the other hand, an extreme value, which is rare, is an observation with a very low probability 
of occurrence, but there is no statistical evidence to confirm that it originates from a different 
distribution. Outliers tend to increase error variance and reduce the power of statistical tests. 
Besides, if they are non-randomly distributed, they can minimize normality and thus, in 
multivariate analysis, they breach the assumption of specificity and multivariate normality, 
affecting the possibility of both type 1 and type 2 error. Therefore, they can influence certain 
variables of interest in a study (Seo 2006). 
Generally, observations with more than three standard deviations from the mean are regarded as 
outliers. However, if the outlier has to be used in the study, it has to be changed to a value that 
equals the extreme scores that lie between three standard deviations of the mean. Alternatively, 
formal and informal tests can be carried out to detect the outlier, i.e. test of discordancy and outlier-
labelling method (Garson 2012). 
However, because of the sample size of this study—63 observations—a standard deviation of 2.5 
or higher was considered an outlier. Thus, in the data cleaning and screening process, the authors 
tried to normalize observations with more than three standard deviations from the mean to cases 
that were identical to the next extreme observation in the dataset (Aggarwal 2015). In this case, 
the size of damages, which was an outlier, had values ranging from $500 to $147,000. It was 
transformed into a logarithmic function to ensure normality. 
Because of the comprehensive and exhaustive data cleaning and screening, all the observations for 
this study fell within the +/- 2.5 standard deviation range. Apart from the detection of outliers and 
normalizing it in the dataset, the authors also analysed the observations for skewness and kurtosis 
(Ab Hamid et al. 2011, Aggarwal 2015). 
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7.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics is a branch of statistics that deals with organizing, displaying and describing 
of data (Trochim 2006). It refers to the presentation of numerical facts, in either table or graphs, 
and of details about the methodology of analysing such data. This procedure effectively describes, 
analyses, and interprets quantitative data. Descriptive statistics accentuates the numerical and 
graphical approach in representing, describing, and interpreting data (Leach 1979). Sound 
measurement, devoid of any coding error, generally makes the result of a statistical analysis valid, 
dependable, and reliable. Thus, it is expedient to run descriptive statistics methods on a given 
dataset to be certain that the data is as expected in terms of mean and standard deviation, and there 
are no outliers beyond the normally expected range. This involves the measures of central 
tendency, which includes range, mean, median, and mode; it also includes measures such as 
standard deviation, variance, and an assessment for skewness and kurtosis, etc. (Garson 2012). 
The tables below give details of the descriptive statistics for this study: 
 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Characteristics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SIZOFDAMAGES 63 500.00 147000.00 19254 30514 
KINDOFCONTRACT 63 .00 1.00 .4603 .50243 
 
Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics of Constructs 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
HIDDENACT 63 2.75 6.75 4.90 .97 
ASYMMINFO 63 1.25 7.00 3.83 1.54 
TRUST 63 1.25 7.00 3.63 1.56 
SELFPROT 63 1.25 7.00 1.60 1.44 
PRESCREEN 63 1.75 6.00 4.18 1.02 
SELFPROT X KINDOFCONTRACT 63 .00 6.50 1.60 2.02 
SIZOFDAMAGES 63 2.70 5.17 4.00 .48 
KINDOFCONTRACT 63 .00 1.00 .46 .50 
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7.4 Scale Reliability 
Reliability refers to the consistency and stability of a given measure in the administering and 
scoring of a given test. Thus, when multiple and independent methods are used in a given study, 
and they produce the same conclusions, the study has greater reliability than when a single 
approach is used to address a given problem. Thus, a combination of methodologies to study the 
same situation is referred to as ‘triangulation’ and it is deemed more reliable than a single 
methodological approach (Kelliher 2011). Morse et al. (2012) emphasize that every research must 
have an element of rigour, truth-value, applicability, consistency, and neutrality to be deemed 
worthwhile and fit for its intended purpose. There should be a paradigm-specific criterion to 
measure the magnitude of rigour in a study, such as internal validity, external validity, reliability, 
and objectivity. Reliability refers to the extent to which measurements are done repeatedly to 
identify certain influences that make measurements vary from case to case, which can be a source 
of measurement error.   
Cronbach’s alpha is one of the most commonly used tests to ascertain the degree of reliability, 
accuracy, and dependability of a given measure. A reliability coefficient gives an idea about 
whether the expected outcomes of a given measure meet the set criteria. Thus, no validity 
coefficient or factor analysis can be interpreted without a reasonable measure of the degree of error 
of measurement (Cronbach 1951, Cortina 1993). However, to measure the degree of reliability 
properly, it is necessary to conduct two independent measures and compare them. Nonetheless, 
the choice of the reliability measure to be used in a given study is a function of the error-producing 
factor, and the source of variance that is appropriate in a particular case. This forms the basis for 
generalizability theory.  
However, the alpha coefficient as a test of reliability has been found to be insufficient and not 
applicable in many cases (Cortina 1993). However, the authors of this study adopted the alpha 
coefficient to ascertain the magnitude of internal consistency and the degree of reliability of 
constructs employed in the study. Numerous researches have emphasized this as the most 
commonly utilized and objective measure of reliability. It is easy to use since it requires only a 
single test as compared with measures like test-retest reliability estimates. To strengthen the degree 
of reliability further, the authors also conducted a composite reliability test (Tavakol and Dennick 
2011).  
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The table below shows the scores construct of the reliability test obtained from exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), where the degree of correlation between 
significant items was used to populate the Cronbach’s alpha , and significant factor loadings were 
utilized to populate the composite reliability for the constructs in this study.  
 
Table 7.3: Construct Reliability Scores 
Construct Items No. of items Cronbach’s alpha 
(α) 
Composite 
reliability 
HIDDENACT HIDDENACT 1,2,3,4 4 .582 0.59 
SELFPROT SELFPROT 2,4,9,10 4 .805 0.81 
ASYMMINFO ASYMMINFO 1,2,3,4 4 .831 0.84 
PRESCREEN PRESCREEN 1,2,3,4 4 .820 0.82 
TRUST TRUST 1,6,7 3 .817 0.82 
 
As shown in table 7.3, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for most of the constructs is above the 
recommended threshold of 0.7: SELFPROT is 0.8, ASYMMINFO is 0.83, PRESCREEN is 0.8.2, 
and TRUST is 0.81. However, the construct HIDDENACT is 0.582, which is less than 0.7 (Davey, 
Gugiu, and Coryn 2010). Nonetheless, Cronbach’s alpha is still within the recommended threshold 
of reliability and dependability as long as it is greater than or equal to 0.5, and reliability within 
the 0.5 threshold is quite prevalent and acceptable in extant literature (Davey, Gugiu, and Coryn 
2010). In summary, the data collection method for this study shows a robust level of reliability and 
internal consistency, which is fundamental and of paramount significance to making the outcome 
of this study worthwhile and relevant for industry applicability (Davey, Gugiu, and Coryn 2010, 
Cortina 1993). 
 
7.5 Validity  
Validity is the accurate and true representation of the specifics and details of a phenomenon a study 
is planning to explain, describe, and put into theory. The extent of validity varies from one situation 
to another, based on certain influences. Validity seeks to ascertain whether the measurements 
adopted are appropriate and whether they are actually measuring what they are supposed to 
measure (Winter 2000a).  
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Furthermore, validity is the extent to which the measuring instrument accurately measures what is 
it designed to measure. Validity shows the relationship between the variable being measured and 
the nature and use of the measurement being used. This is useful to evaluate an instrument for the 
purpose it was meant to serve.  
There are three main types of validity—criterion-related validity or predictive validity, content 
validity or face validity, and construct validity. These can be further subdivided into other forms 
of validity (Thatcher 2010). Validity is also defined as the degree to which concepts in a given 
study are accurately measured quantitatively to meet their intended objective. The various types 
of validity are defined below: 
 Convergent validity: This is a case where different measures using the same concepts give 
similar results, though the measurement approaches adopted are different. 
 Construct validity: This refers to the ability to draw inferences from the results of the 
concepts studied. It emphasizes the degree to which a given tool actually measures the 
intended construct (Heale and Twycross 2015). 
 Discriminant validity: This shows evidence that the concept measured can be different 
from other concepts, thus leading to a lower degree of correlation between measures. It 
provides proof that one concept is different from another related concept in a study 
(Thatcher 2010). 
 Content validity: This provides evidence for the nature of sample representative and the 
sufficiency of content of a given measurement tool (Heale and Twycross 2015). 
 Face validity: Just by the look of the concept, it will be agreed that the test done is a valid 
and sufficient measure of the concept being measured. This study evaluates whether the 
measure is in line with a conceptual domain of the concept being measured (Heale and 
Twycross 2015). 
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7.5.1 Construct Validity 
Construct validity is pivotal in undertaking studies relevant to convergent and discriminant 
validity. Both forms of validity are essential to ensure that the specifics of construct validity are 
adhered to. The authors adopted the details of the research from previous studies, but calibrated 
the nature of the problem to match the dynamics and specifics of the case. Thus, the construct used 
in the questionnaire is the product of consultation with stakeholders and researchers in the 
Egyptian insurance industry. This satisfies the threshold of content validity, which is essential for 
the study (Thatcher 2010, Parker, Taylor, and Bagby 2003) 
7.5.2 Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity refers to the degree of distinctiveness of different constructs in a study. This 
study conducted an exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation to measure both discriminant 
and convergent validity (Guo et al. 2008). Thus, items with a greater loading factor loaded 
accordingly on the factors that are in line with the conceptualized constructs for this study. This 
signifies that the measure fully captured what it was designed to capture. Therefore, the KMO 
delineation of the sampling adequacy in this study, which is 0.77, showed that common factors 
could describe inter-firm correlation. Thus, the Bartlett’s  sphericity is also hugely valid in this 
study (Hadia, Abdullah, and Sentosa 2016). 
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Table 7.4: Exploratory Factor Analysis (n=63) 
CONSTRUCTS FACTOR 1 
ASYMMINF
O 
FACTOR 2 
PRESCREE
N 
FACTOR 3 
SELFPROT 
FACTOR 4 
TRUST 
FACTOR 5 
HIDDENAC
T 
ASYMMINFO1 .849 .079 .051 .212 .060 
ASYMMINFO2 .844 .179 .251 .130 -.019- 
ASYMMINFO3 .559 .233 .497 .498 .138 
ASYMMINFO4 . 855 .180 . 186 .068 .032 
PRESCREEN1 -.104- .914 -.104- -.025- -.069- 
PRESCREEN2 -.140- .898 -.170- -.106- -.113- 
PRESCREEN3 -.275- .711 -.131- -.175- -.028- 
PRESCREEN4 .005 .588 .140 -.305- -.265- 
SELFPROT2 .251 .179 .844 .130 -.019- 
SELFPROT4 .186 .180 .855 .068 .032 
SELFPROT9 .371 .157 .719 -.113- -.315- 
SELFPROT10 .225 .142 .617 .224 -.056- 
TRUST1 .212 .079 .051 .849 .060 
TRUST6 .276 .060 .098 .868 -.083- 
TRUST7 .383 .237 .147 .712 -.177- 
HIDDENACT1 -.057- .399 -.006- .103 .770 
HIDDENACT2 .124 .009 .087 -.355- .708 
HIDDENACT3 .098 . 469 .099 .105 .616 
HIDDENACT4 .298 .355 .224 .030 .480 
Eigen value 2.98 3.07 2.22 2.14 1.52 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in eight iterations 
The EFA, as shown in the table above, provides sufficient evidence for convergent and 
discriminant validity, as the loading of one unique construct is higher than the loading of measures 
of other constructs in the study (Rencher 2002a).  
To establish discriminant validity, it is important to have a proper average-variance-extracted 
(AVE) analysis. The authors ascertained whether the square root of each AVE value belonging to 
each latent construct was higher than any correlation among any pair of latent constructs.  
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AVE measures the explained variance of a given construct. When the authors compared the AVE 
and the correlation coefficient of a given construct in this study, they wanted to ascertain whether 
the item of the given construct explained more variance than the items of the other construct did.  
AVE, which measures discriminant validity, can be calculated as AVE = Σ [λi 2] / Σ [λi 2] + Σ 
[Var (εi)] where λi shows the loading of each measurement item on its corresponding construct 
and εi is the error measurement (Zaiţ and BERTEA 2011). For further analysis, this study used 
AMOS 22 to populate the AVE, using standardized factor loadings. After obtaining the AVE, it 
was observed that the AVE was greater than the multiple squared correlation for the construct 
under study, as shown below in table 7.5. This further strengthens and accentuates proof for 
discriminant validity (Suhr 2006). 
 
Table 7.5: Discriminant Validity, Squared Inter-Construct Correlation (R2) and Average 
Variance Extracted (AVE) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. HIDDENACT 1.000 .331 .117 .015 .003 .000 .127 .475 
2. SIZOFDAMAGES  1.000 .477 .051 .041 .412 .042 .124 
3. KINDOFCONTRACT   1.000 .082 .189 .456 .430 .141 
4. SELFPROT    1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
5. ASYMMINFO     1.000 .000 .000 .000 
6. PRESCREEN      1.000 .001 .061 
7. TRUST       1.000 .000 
8. SELFPROT X KINDOFCONTR        1.000 
AVE  .81 - - .92 .60 .85 .39 - 
As seen in the table above, the AVE of this study ranges from 0.39 to 0.92, with constructs such 
as hidden action problems (HIDDENACT), self-protection (SELFPROT), and asymmetric 
information (ASYMMINFO) exceeding the 0.50 threshold criterion. However, at 0.39, the AVE 
values for trust (TRUST) is below the minimum threshold criterion (Chen, Wang, and Chen 2012). 
 _______________________________ 
AVE = (Sum of squared standardized loadings) / [(Sum of squared standardized loadings) + (Sum of indicator 
measurement error)]. 
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Nonetheless, existing literature validates the use of values below 0.50 when the construct reliability 
is robust (Zaiţ and BERTEA 2011), as in this case. Furthermore, constructs with AVE values above 
0.30 are a largely acceptable benchmark in exploratory research. In summary, all constructs used 
in this study robustly support discriminant validity (Hadia, Abdullah, and Sentosa 2016, Hair et 
al. 2010, Rencher 2003). 
7.5.3 Convergent Validity 
This study used the convergent validity to ascertain the agreement between different variables of 
the same construct. Some degree of convergent validity in the EFA can be ascertained from the 
table above. As depicted in table 7.5, the Eigenvalues for the different constructs are higher than 
the threshold criterion of 1.0. The Eigen value for the EFA ranges between 1.52 and 3.07. The 
output of the CFA as shown below is significant with the t value >0.05. In addition, the own factor 
loading also surpasses the criterion limit of 0.5, thus accentuating convergent validity (Chen, 
Wang, and Chen 2012). Furthermore, the composite reliability study for SELPROT, ASYMINFO, 
PRESCREEN and TRUST are all greater than 0.60—beyond the acceptable threshold criterion. 
Although at 0.59, HIDDENACT is slightly below the minimum acceptable threshold criterion, it 
can be approximated to 0.60, which is the acceptable threshold criterion. This confirms adequate 
acceptance of convergent validity in the study (Ab Hamid et al. 2011, Hair et al. 2010, Rencher 
2003). 
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Table 7.6: Measurement Model Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Results (n=63) 
 
Construct Factor loading 
(t–value)b 
Seven-point Likert-scale-type items with end points 
strongly disagree and strongly agree 
 
Self-protection 
SELFPROT: 4 ITEMS 
p = 0.17 
CFI = 0.95; IFI = 0.95 
RMSEA = 0.25 
α = 0.80; CR = 0.81 
0.694a 
 
0.638 
 
0.749 
 
0.903 
SELFPROT10: The drivers of this policyholder never break the 
speed limit while driving 
SELFPROT9: This policyholder never gets any part of the cars 
repaired during maintenance without the insurer’s permission 
SELFPROT4: This policyholder never allows another person to 
drive the car without the insurer’s permission 
SELFPROT2: This policyholder never leaves the car with the 
engine running 
 
 
 
Asymmetric Information 
ASYMMINFO:4 ITEMS 
p = 0.00 
CFI = 0.90; IFI = 0.90 
RMSEA = 0.32 
α = 0.83; CR = 0.84 
0.720a 
 
 
0.906 
 
 
1.910 
 
 
0.852 
ASYMMINFO4: It is very difficult for our company to get exact 
information about whether this policyholder has abided by the 
load capacity clause 
ASYMMINFO3: It is very difficult for our company to 
know/verify whether this policyholder has given correct 
information about the car’s operating hours per day 
ASYMMINFO2: It is very difficult for our company to 
know/verify whether this policyholder has hired unqualified 
drivers 
ASYMMINFO1: It is very difficult for our company to 
know/verify whether the drivers have driven under the influence 
of alcohol/drugs 
 
Pre-screening  
PRESCREEN: 4 ITEMS 
p = 0.01 
CFI = 0.91; IFI = 0.91 
RMSEA = 0.22 
α = 0.82; CR = 0.82 
0.468a 
 
 
0.814 
 
 
0.872 
 
 
PRESCREEN4: Before we signed the contract, we checked that 
this policyholder provided the required certificates, such as the 
traffic certificate 
PRESCREEN3: Before we signed the contract, we confirmed 
that the cars of this policyholder had not had any previous 
collisions 
PRESCREEN2: Before we signed the contract, we confirmed 
that this policyholder’s car was not older than the specified age 
(6 years) to get the insurance policy 
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0.884 PRESCREEN1: Before we signed the contract, we confirmed 
that this policyholder had met the requirement for the specific 
number of kilometres to get the insurance policy  
Trust  
TRUST: 3 ITEMS 
p = 0.02 
CFI = 0.93; IFI = 0.91 
RMSEA = 0.19 
α = 0.81; CR = 0.82 
Trivial fit for three-item 
scale 
0.732a 
 
0.669 
 
0.870 
 
TRUST7: This policyholder always keeps the promises it makes 
to our company  
TRUST6: This policyholder has high levels of integrity and 
honesty with regard to our company’s business dealings 
TRUST1: This policyholder fulfils the promises it makes to our 
company regarding the actions of self-protection 
 
 
Hidden action  
HIDDENACT: 4 ITEMS 
CFI = 1.01; IFI = 1.01 
RMSEA = 0.28 
α = 0.58; CR = 0.59 
 
 
0.618a 
 
 
0.815 
 
 
0.295 
 
0.617 
HIDDENACT4: This policyholder sometimes makes false 
promises about the maintenance of his cars at the original brand 
centre 
HIDDENACT3: When an accident occurs, this policyholder 
does not inform my company on time, which is against the terms 
of contract 
HIDDENACT2: When an accident occurs, this policyholder 
claims a huge (abnormal) amount of damages  
HIDDENACT1: This policyholder sometimes pretends that he 
uses his cars for the purpose mentioned in the insurance policy 
to get different incentives from my company. He actually uses 
his cars for purposes other than that mentioned in the policy 
aFixed variable. 
bStandardized loadings significant at p < 0.05 
 
7.6 Assessment of the Hypothesized Measurement Model 
To fully evaluate and assess how well the hypothesized model fits the data, and to look out for 
unidimensionality, this study used AMOS 22 to run CFA to measure this assessment. From table 
7.6 above, the CFA output emphatically confirms its success (Chen, Wang, and Chen 2012). The 
loading factors are also significant at p<0.05. In addition, based on their association—as their signs 
show—the parameters under study acted just as predicted (see appendix 3).  
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The p values are quite significant; furthermore, many other fit indices meet the acceptable 
threshold criterion. For example, CFI=0.93 and IFI=0.91—both are above the minimum 0.90 
threshold. RMSEA=0.28, which is above 0.08, which is the minimum acceptable criterion. In 
short, based on the different statistics shown above, numerous evidences fully and robustly support 
the degree of fit of the hypothesized model and dataset (Suhr 2006, Ab Hamid et al. 2011). 
 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter covered preliminary data analysis from assessment, cleaning and screening of 
observations for normality in the dataset, and various checks. It gave details of the descriptive 
statistics of this study. It provided the measurement of validity and reliability for the study, and 
evidence pertaining to the problem. Finally, the authors ran a check for regression analysis to 
ascertain how fit the hypothesized model was to the data. The next chapter will present further 
detailed analysis and findings of the study.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
HYPOTHESES TESTS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides further detailed analysis of the study, based on the foundation, and the 
various tests and data validations already mentioned in the preceding chapter. It gives the result of 
the regression analysis, delineating the various relationships between and among the variables used 
in this study. Furthermore, it shows the test and results of the hypotheses, which form the crux of 
this study as the authors set out to prove and validate the propositions. 
 
8.2. Regression Model 
To test and effectively measure the hypotheses, the authors adopted the ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression model technique, which has been extensively used in extant literature to analyse 
relationships and interactions between and among variables in a study (Lavine 2005). The 
objective is to test both the main and interaction effects as highlighted in the conceptual research 
model of the study. After testing the main effects of self-protection (SELFPROT), asymmetric 
information (ASSYMINFO), pre-screening (PRESCREEN), and trust (TRUST), and the 
interaction effect of self-protection based on the kind of contract agreed upon, the regression model 
for this study is given below: 
HIDDENACT = b0 + b1 $SIZDAMAGES + b2 KINDCONTRAC + b3 SELFPROT + b4 
ASYMMINFO + b5 PRESCREEN + b6 TRUST + b7 SELFPROT x 
KINDCONTRAC + ε                                                         Equation 8.1 
Where:  
HIDDENACT=hidden actions of policyholders is the dependent variable in the study. 
SELFPROT=self-protection, ASYMMINFO=asymmetric information, PRESCREEN=pre-
screening, TRUST=trust, and KINDCONTRAC=kind of contract are the independent variables. 
SIZDAMAGES=size of damages represents the control variable and SELFPROT x 
KINDCONTRAC is the interaction between self-protection and the contract type. b0=constant 
term, bb1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7=the regression coefficients ε=error term. 
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8.3 Estimating Results 
8.3.1 Correlation Matrix 
A challenge this study faced at the preliminary stage was the interaction effect between the 
variables, which posed the risk of multicollinearity. Since the objective of the regression model is 
to measure dependency and not interdependencies among variables, it is a sign of poor 
experimental design, which poses a threat to accurately estimate and effectively specify the 
relationship the regression analysis seeks to establish (Farrar and Glauber 1967). In this case, the 
assumption that explanatory variables must be independent of each other is violated.  
A major challenge in regression analysis arises when one predictor seems to correlate with another, 
which seems to be a duplicate. This happens when two or more explanatory variables in a sample 
overlap (Rencher 2002b, Willis and Perlack 1978). This problem is very disturbing in regression 
analysis as it leads to estimation error of the regression coefficient; it affects the R square, which 
leads to larger variance (standard error) in estimates and hence to poor quality of the result 
parameter estimates. In some cases, it also leads to misspecification of the model, resulting in 
biased least square estimators. It makes estimates to a given dataset very sensitive, thus altering 
the estimate coefficient. Separating the influence of explanatory variables and the inability to 
explain the variance in the dependent variable is a problem (Willis and Perlack 1978). 
To solve this problem and avoid its adverse effect on estimates, it is important to use tolerance and 
variance inflation factor (VIF) (Rencher 2002b, Voss 2004). Using the tolerance method to 
mitigate the impact of multicollinearity, a Pearson coefficient is populated for the independent 
variables and subtracted from one (1-Rsquare). The greater the value, the lower is the degree of 
multicollinearity. Thus, the threshold criterion for acceptability is a value equal to or greater than 
0.1 (Rencher 2002b).  
As a solution to the problem of multicollinearity, the authors adopted the mean centring of the 
independent variables used in the interaction term. They did this to increase the estimation 
accuracy of the regression coefficient as used in numerous extant literatures (Willis and Perlack 
1978). Adopting the mean centring of the independent variable and the moderator variable ensures 
the moderation of the independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable at the given  
moderator variable displays  its mean. 
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Thus, the interaction term is not adversely affected (Rencher 2002b). In addition, this study 
perused the presence of heteroscedasticity, but found no evidence of it. Below is the correlation 
matrix: 
Table 8.1: Correlation Matrix, Descriptive Statistics and Collinearity Diagnostics 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. HIDDENACT 1.0 .05 -.15 .27 .33 -.54 .14 -.01 
2. SIZOFDAMAGE  1.0 .01 -.21 -.22 .03 -.22 -.14 
3. KINDOFCONTRACT   1.0 -.17 -.11 .02 -.03 -.14 
4. SELFPROT    1.0 .85 -.45 .59 .71 
5. ASYMMINFO     1.0 -.47 .76 .65 
6. PRESCREEN      1.0 -.39 -.19 
7. TRUST       1.0 .45 
8. SELFPROT X KINDOFCONTR        1.0 
Mean  4.90 4.00 .46 .00 3.83 4.18 3.61 -.12 
Std. Deviation  .97 .48 .50 1.44 1.54 1.02 1.60 1.00 
Tolerance   .93 .95 .21 .16 .17 .39 .46 
VIF   1.07 1.04 4.66 6.10 1.40 2.51 2.17 
aMean-centred variables 
bTransformed variables into natural logarithm 
The table above gives details of the correlation matrix, descriptive statistics and collinearity 
diagnostics. 
 
8.4 Regression Analysis   
The regression analysis covered in this work principally deals with the main effect, the interaction 
effect, and the control effect. As a result, the authors have utilized a hierarchical regression model 
using SPSS to explain the effects of independent variables and the interaction term in the research 
model, and show the magnitude of effect on the predictive power of the research model (Faraway 
2002). The authors selected this approach because it can adequately explain and substantiate the 
relationship between the main effect and the interaction effect. Finally, the authors used the f value 
for each model (see appendices) to provide the details for comparison and interpretation of the 
results for both model 1 and 2.  
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Table 8.2: Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Dependent Variable—Hidden Action by 
Policyholders (HIDDENACT) 
Model 
 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
 
(Constant) (b0) 5.933 1.233  4.813 .000 
SIZOFDAMAGE (b1) .143 .216 .072 .661 .511 
KINDCONTRAC (b2) -.262- .209 -.135- -1.254- .215 
SELFPROT (b3) -.167- .142 -.248- -1.182- .242 
ASYMMINFO (b4) .340 .162 .539 2.105 .040 
PRESCREEN (b5) -.501- .116 -.526- -4.336- .000 
TRUST (b6) -.189- .101 -.311- -1.864- .068 
           Model 1 Fit:                                                        R2 = 0.380, R2Adj = 0.314, F(6.56) = 5.720, p = 000, n = 63 
aSignificant at p < 0.01 for t-values greater than 2.33 one tail  
bSignificant at p < 0.05 for t-values greater than 1.65 one tail  
cSignificant at p < 0.10 for t-values greater than 1.28 one tail  
dNot significant 
As the starting point, variables were mean centred to attenuate the problem of multicollinearity, 
and as such, the tolerance and VIF met their various threshold criterion for acceptance—that is, 
greater than 0.10 for tolerance and less than 10 for VIF. In the first instance, that is, the case of 
model 1, hidden action by policyholders were regressed on self-protection (SELFPROT), 
asymmetric information (ASYMMINFO), trust (TRUST), and pre-screening (PRESCREEN) 
Model  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
2 (Constant) (b0) 5.36 1.21  4.41a .00 
SIZOFDAMAGE (b1) 0.16 .21 .08 .75d .45 
KINDCONTRAC (b2) -0.26 .20 -.13 -1.32c .19 
SELFPROT (b3) -0.04 .15 -.05 -.23d .81 
ASYMMINFO (b4)                                           H1 (+) 0.40 .16 .63 2.55a .01 
PRESCREEN (b5)                                            H2 (-) -0.44 .11 -.46 -3.85a .00 
TRUST (b6)                                                       H3 (-) -0.20 .09 -.32 -2.00b .05 
SELFPROT X KINDCONTRAC (b7)            H4 (-) -0.33 .14 -.34 -2.30b .02 
        Model 2 Fit:                                       R2 = 0.435, R2Adj = 0.363, F(7.55) = 6.040, p = 000, R2-change = 0.435, n = 63 
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using the size of damages (SIZDAMAGES) as a control variable. As depicted in table 8.2 above, 
model 1 provides sufficient and robust explanation for hidden action by policyholders by showing 
31% variance with R2 adjusted = 0.31. It is significant at the p< 0.05 level.  
Model 2 takes into account the interaction terms between variables, that is, the case of self-
protection and kind of contract. Thus, the goodness of fit for the estimated regression model is 
significant with F (6.56)=5.720, R2 adjusted=0.432 (see appendices 5a and 5b). Therefore, model 
2 gives a sufficient and robust explanation for the variation in the degree of hidden action by 
policyholders, with an explanatory strength of 43%. Such good fit indicates that the research model 
provides an exhaustive and sufficient description of the dataset used in the study (Faraway 2002). 
In summary, the impact of the interaction effect can be measured in the F change, which is 
significant at p<0.05 level at F (7.55)=6.040 (see appendix 5a). 
This shows that the research model predicts very well the interaction effect between self-protection 
and the kind of contract and its impact on hidden action problems. The F value for both models 
are significant at the p<0.05 level, denoting that the independent variables and interaction terms 
sufficiently explain the variation of hidden action problems. Therefore, the model fully and 
adequately fits the dataset. In summary, 43% of the level of variation in hidden action problems, 
which is the dependent variable, is explained by the independent variables self-protection, 
asymmetric information, pre-screening, trust, the interaction effect between self-protection and 
kind of contract, and the control variable size of damages. 
 
8.5 Test of Hypotheses   
From table 8.2, the regression equation can be formulated and it yields the following result: 
To ascertain the degree of interaction between the terms in equation 8.2, the authors took the partial 
derivative of self-protection and kind of contract with respect to hidden action by policyholders, 
as prescribed in extant literature. This study considered how the nature of contact signed ex-ante 
would influence the degree of self-protection by the policyholder ex-post and subsequently 
influence the magnitude of hidden action in the relationship. This yielded the equation below:  
HIDDENACT = 5.36 + 0.16 SIZDAMAGES – 0.26 KINDCONTRAC – 0.04 SELFPROT 
+ 0.40 ASYMMINFO – 0.44 PRESCREEN – 0.20 TRUST – 0.33 
SELFPROT x KINDCONTRAC                                Equation 8.2 
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                                                                                     Equation 8.3 
 
Equation 8.2 shows the regression model for this study and depicts the nature of relationship 
between the dependent variable, hidden action by policyholders (HIDDENACT), and the 
independent variables self-protection (SELFPROT), asymmetric information (ASYMMINOF), 
pre-screening (PRESCREEN) and trust (TRUST). It also shows the interaction effect between self-
protection (SELFPROT) and kind of contract (KINDCONTRAC), and finally with the control 
variable, size of damages (SIZDAMAGES).  
Hypothesis H1 explains that as the degree of asymmetric information in an exchange 
relationship—that is, the interaction between the policyholder and the insurer—increases, the level 
of hidden action problems increases too. Since one party to the exchange (the policyholder) has 
private and idiosyncratic information that the other is not aware of, it has more knowledge about 
its risk profile ex-ante, and such information is critical to the nature of the exchange. Thus, one 
party tends to take advantage of such information gap and act opportunistically, exacerbating the 
magnitude of hidden action problems in the relationship. 
Hypothesis H2 shows that there is a negative relationship between pre-screening and hidden action 
problems. Thus, as the degree and strength of pre-screening increases, hidden action problems 
reduce drastically. Pre-screening allows the insurer to get comprehensive and detailed information 
about the risk profile of the policyholder, and the dynamics of the event to be insured. This ensures 
that the proper product is offered to the policyholder based on his/her peculiarities, thus mitigating 
the probability of hidden action problems. 
Hypothesis H3 postulates and proves that there is a negative relationship between the level of trust 
and hidden action by policyholders. As the level of trust in an exchange relationship increases over 
time—usually after repeated dealings—partners feel obligated to fulfil their side of the bargain 
and preserve the relationship, which will grow stronger with time and common norms and values 
will be established. The magnitude of hidden action problems will be significantly reduced because 
of the prevalence of trust in the exchange relationship. 
 
 
δHIDDENACT
δSELFPROT
=  b1 + b7 KINDCONTRAC
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From the equation above, all the hypotheses are significant and fully supported. The table above 
reveals that the first hypothesis H1 (b4=0.40, t=2.55, p<0.005) shows a positive association 
between information asymmetry and hidden action problems. The table also reveals that 
hypothesis H2, H3 and H4 are all significantly valid and fully supported H2 (b5=-0.44, t =-3.85, 
p<0.05), H3 (b6=-0.20, t=-2.00). 
The interaction effect of self-protection in relation to hidden action problems in different kinds of 
contract is negative and significant (H4) (b4=-0.33, t value=-2.30, P<0.05 one tail). For the fourth 
and final hypothesis, the equation above shows the interaction effect between self-protection and 
kind of contract, thus showing its impact on the degree of hidden action problems. 
8.5.1 Interpretation of Interaction Effect: SELFPROT x KINDCONTRAC 
As the starting point, the authors conducted a partial derivative on hidden action problems 
(HIDDENACT) with respect to self-protection based on the estimated regression equation shown 
in equation 8.3, which gives the output below: 
 
δHIDDENACT
δSELFPROT
 =  − 0.04 − 0.33 KINDCONTRAC                           Equation 8.4   
                     
Figure 8.1 below denotes the effect of hidden action problems based on the interaction between 
the degree of self-protection and kind of contract. It shows that the degree of hidden action 
problems is not responsive to every contract type. Thus, the incentive for self-protection and 
reduction of hidden action problems is a function of the nature of agreement with policyholders. 
The upper horizontal section of the figure shows that with a deductible contract type, regardless of 
the degree of self-protection, there is little or no probability of the reduction of hidden action 
problems. That is because in a deductible contract, the policyholder only pays the initial amount 
of the loss, and subsequently, the insurer takes over and indemnifies the policyholder for the 
remainder of the loss. Thus, even if the policyholder invests in self-protection, it will not reduce 
hidden action in any case. That is because the policyholder is likely to be tempted to act 
opportunistically as there is little or no incentive to invest in self-protection. The insurer will 
compensate for a huge portion of the loss anyway. 
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The bottom horizontal section shows that the co-payment contract type will moderate the degree 
of hidden action problems substantially. Under this arrangement, policyholders pay a huge part of 
the compensation for any loss suffered, and the higher the loss, the greater is the contribution. 
Consequently, co-payment obligates policyholders to spend on self-protection as a pre-emptive 
measure to deter the event insured against from occurring, since it will have serious consequences, 
both financially and from a business perspective. This will greatly reduce the probability of hidden 
action, thus confirming that co-payment is a more useful and practical measure to encourage self-
protection among policyholders and to minimize the degree of hidden action problems.  
  
Figure 8.1 The Effect of Self-protection on Hidden Action Problems by Policyholders in 
Different Kinds of Car Insurance Contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Note:            indicates the effect of self-protection on reducing hidden action in different kinds of 
contracts 
The above equation illustrates the estimated main effect of self-protection on hidden action by 
policyholder. It can be seen from the figure that the effect of self-protection is almost nothing (-
0.04) when the kind of contract is zero, which represents deductible contract. The effect of self-
protection is very high (-0.04-0.33 =-0.37) when the kind of contract is co-payment. In conclusion, 
it can be said that the effect of self-protection is very little or non-existent in the case of deductible 
contract and very high in the case of co-payment contract. 
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8.6 Summary of the Hypotheses 
Table 8.3: Summary of the Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis Coefficient t-value Findings 
H1: There is a positive association between the level of 
information asymmetry involved and hidden action by 
policyholders in the Egyptian car insurance market 
 
 0.40 
 
2.55a 
 
Supported  
 
H2: There is a negative association between the levels of 
pre-screening by the insurer and hidden action by 
policyholders in the Egyptian car insurance market  
 
- 0.44 
 
-3.55a 
 
Supported  
 
H3: There is a negative association between the level of 
trust and hidden action by policyholders in the Egyptian car 
insurance market 
 
- 0.20 
 
-2.00b 
 
Supported  
 
H4: The association between self-protection and hidden 
action by policyholders is more negatively shaped with co-
payment contract than with deductible contract. 
 
- 0.33 
 
-2.30b 
 
Supported  
 
aSignificant at p < 0.01 for t-values greater than 2.33 one tail 
bSignificant at p < 0.05 for t-values greater than 1.65 one tail 
 
8.7 Summary  
This study used the ordinary least square (OLS) regression technique to generate the estimated 
regression model. It also showed the use of hierarchical regression to further analyse the estimated 
hidden action problems and test the hypotheses accordingly. In short, all the hypotheses (H1, H2, 
H3, H4) were duly and robustly supported. The next section gives the summary of the findings of 
the study in line with relevant theoretical framework. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
9.1 Introduction 
This is the final chapter of this study and covers a summary discussion of the previous chapters 
based on the relevant theoretical framework used in this work. Furthermore, this chapter presents 
the key findings of this work based on the research questions and the objective of the study. In 
short, the authors offer the theoretical and managerial implications of the study, with its limitations, 
and propositions for future direction. 
 
9.2 Summary of the Findings 
The primary objective of this study was to analyse and discuss the antecedents and consequences 
of hidden action by policyholders in a buyer-seller relationship in the car insurance market. 
However, this study sought to delineate the moderating effect of self-protection at different kinds 
of contract signed on the degree of hidden action problems in an exchange relationship. Thus, the 
findings of this study are expected to help the stakeholders of the insurance industry, such as 
policymakers, industry professionals, and senior management practitioners, to coordinate the 
exchange relationship between policyholders and insurers better, considering the ever-evolving 
complexity and the dynamic nature of the business environment. This will improve integration, 
and cooperation, which will enhance business and provide sustainable competitive business 
advantage, offering flexibility and helping the businesses adapt to the ever-changing market.  
Table 8.1 shows the hierarchical regression model and analysis. Table 8.3 shows the principal 
findings of this study, and depicts the goodness of fit for this model: R2=0.435, R2Adj=0.363, F 
(7.55)=6.040, p=000, R2-change=0.435, n=63. 
All four hypotheses (H1, H2, H3, and H4) were fully supported, as mentioned earlier. All the 
hypotheses conformed to theoretical reasoning and showed the expected signs in all the tests done. 
Furthermore, the construct of the interaction term showed the expected sign and was significant. 
The control variable—the size of damages, i.e. the amount of compensation the insurer paid to 
policyholders—was also significant and produced the expected sign with b=0.16, t=0.75 
significant at p<0.05.  
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Various appropriate signs show that the findings follow the related empirical setting and the 
relevant theoretical framework in this research, including PAT and RCT. 
The findings highlight the fact that the degree of asymmetric information is positively associated 
with hidden action problems; the greater the degree of asymmetric information in an exchange 
relationship, the higher is the hidden action problem. Information asymmetry increases the 
knowledge gap between insurers and policyholders. Policyholders tend to behave opportunistically 
and use this private information in their favour. This affects the kind of agreement signed with the 
insurer and poses the problems of adverse selection and moral hazards, thus increasing the 
likelihood of hidden action by policyholders.  
Thus, the amount of information about policyholders’ risks and activities, both ex-ante and ex-
post, is critical to effectively manage them for the desired optimal outcome in the business 
relationship. However, if the magnitude of information asymmetry is reduced, hidden action 
problems will go down, too. Hence, an effective risk management strategy is in place when the 
insurer can access and evaluate policyholders and put the appropriate caveats in the contract to 
forestall hidden action. The study found this to be positive and significant. 
However, the degree of trust in an exchange relationship is found to attenuate the extent of hidden 
action problems. Trust serves as a tool of accountability and consistency; satisfactory and 
impressive encounters between trading partners help it develop. This weakens the likelihood that 
any partner will pursue action that will be inimical to the relationship; they value the interaction 
and are willing to invest their integrity help it sustain.  
Thus, the level of trust reduces hidden action problems; the value was negative and significant. 
The level of pre-screening was also found to be negatively associated with the degree of hidden 
action by policyholders in the Egyptian car insurance market. This association was significant as 
well. Finally, the study found that self-protection was also negatively associated with hidden action 
problems, influenced by the kind of contract signed with policyholders. There was a sharp 
reduction in hidden actions problems when the contract type was co-payment, but a deductible 
contract had a small or almost no effect.  
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9.3 Discussions and Implications 
9.3.1 Theoretical Implications   
The main goal of this work was to bring to light empirical evidence and implications in a dyadic 
relationship in the service industry, in line with theoretical assertions relevant to the study, such as 
the PAT and RCT. Against this background, this study applied the appropriate theoretical 
framework to analyse the nature of relationship between the insurer and policyholders in the 
Egyptian car insurance market, and show how certain dimensions tended to significantly weaken 
the presence of hidden action problems in the exchange relationship.  
Trust in attenuating hidden action 
The study highlighted the fact that the level of trust in a buyer-seller relationship deters hidden 
action problems. The latter normally appear ex-post since it is impractical, expensive, and difficult 
from a business perspective to monitor policyholders efficiently and ensure compliance with 
contractual terms to promote self-protection and induce efforts to attenuate hidden actions 
problems. Thus, trust is essential to hold parties accountable seamlessly in the exchange. The two 
theories (PAT and RCT) validate this. Thus, the authors formulated the hypotheses based on the 
relevant theoretical framework and the nature and dynamics of the Egyptian insurance market, 
which serves as the foundation for these hypotheses.  
Nature of the principal-agent problem 
As the principal-agent problem in agency theory highlights, one party to an exchange can take 
actions that materially affect the transaction if the other party is unable to monitor or enforce 
compliance. This is quite prevalent in most principal-agent relationships because of information 
asymmetry—that is, one party in the exchange possesses special information that the other is not 
privy to, and can pursue actions based on that, which influences the outcome of the exchange 
(Keser and Willinger 2000). 
Information asymmetry as an antecedent of hidden action 
For a business transaction between two parties to be successful, it is important that all material 
information in the exchange is available to both. However, the presence of information 
asymmetry—wherein one party has information about his/her peculiar characteristics that the 
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trading partner is unaware of—and the ability of one party to carry out actions that would violate 
the agreement after signing the contract increase the chances of the risk to occur (Katz 1998).  
The degree of asymmetric information is positively related to hidden action problems, and worsens 
the business relationship. It implicitly forces one party to act opportunistically in the exchange 
because of informational advantage. This finding of the study is consistent with the empirical 
evidence that the higher the level of information asymmetry in an exchange relationship, the 
greater is the hidden action problem (b=0.04, t=2.55, p<0.05). Theoretical framework such as the 
PAT and RCT support this finding—the degree of information asymmetry between the principal 
and the agent in an exchange increases the transaction cost and ex-post hidden action problems, as 
agents tend to choose actions that maximize their profits (Katz 1998). 
Pre-screening as a preventative control of hidden action 
Furthermore, the study established that pre-screening is an essential part of the insurance market 
value chain, as it validates tangible and critical facts in the insurance agreement. Thus, it provides 
adequate and the requisite information, revealing the probability of an accident and the degree of 
risk aversion of policyholders. This significantly influences the nature of the contract, as insurers 
tend to price their product and services based on the peculiar characteristics of different 
policyholders. A detailed and exhaustive pre-screening process enhances the insurers’ ability to 
categorize policyholders efficiently, thus minimizing the degree of hidden action problems and 
ensuring that the appropriate product and contract are given to policyholders based on their 
individual peculiarities (Smart 2000).  
Theoretical validation of pre screening 
The hypotheses support the theoretical underpinning that the degree of pre-screening will increase 
the possibility that hidden action problems will go down. As insurer will then be able to deal with 
the peculiarities of the policyholders. The work of Netzer and Scheuer (2010) well highlights this. 
They emphasize the need to categorize policyholders based on their risk profile and individualities. 
It is very cumbersome for the principal (insurer) to monitor the performance of the agents 
(policyholders), let alone fully verify their ex-post actions. To avoid paying damages based on 
discretion and subjective assessment, it is important that the insurer carry out the pre-screening 
process in a manner that the policyholders choose a policy type based on their risk profile.  
102 
 
This will lead to self-enforcing contracts, wherein policyholders will be willing to invest in actions 
to mitigate or eliminate the possibility of an accident, thus mitigating or eradicating hidden action 
problems that result from one party’s inability to verify the action of the other. The contract type 
will be exhaustive to measure performance. This will improve the exchange relationship, reduce 
cost and increase profitability for the insurer.  
This argument from the PAT is in line with the findings, and postulated and validated in the 
hypothesis, which states that pre-screening of policyholders significantly reduces the degree of 
hidden action problems. Therefore, this work serves as an extension and confirmation of the 
theoretical framework and its applicability in real-world dynamics (Zhao 2012). 
The level of trust and hidden action in an exchange 
As partners in an inter-firm relationship have repeated successful dealings, they develop over time 
trust in the exchange as well as relationship norms that serve as an appropriate safeguard to govern 
the interaction (Bradach and Eccles 1989, Buvik and Halskau 2001, Granovetter 1985). This 
weakens the possibility of the partners’ behaving opportunistically to harm the relationship; both 
parties will honour their side of the bargain to keep the relationship going. The degree of trust 
increases the chance for the partners to develop relational norms that govern the exchange, thus 
reducing the level of hidden action by policyholders. The findings robustly support this theoretical 
insight elaborated in RCT. Various works by Buvik and Reve (2002) and Macneil (1977) elucidate 
this too.  
Sande and Haugland (2015) pinpointed in their work the shortcomings of aligning exchange 
characteristics in a formal contract in a B2B exchange relationship, which impedes the relationship 
performance and continuity. Therefore, there is need to design formal contracts to minimize 
business hazards in the exchange relationship. These contracts are fine-tuned to achieve strategic 
business outcomes. Thus, the seeming lack of trust in the exchange leads to a misaligned form of 
governance and is a recipe for conflict in the relationship, which affects productivity and business 
performance.  
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Theoretical implication of trust as a factor to attenuate hidden action 
RCT dictates that the presence of trust in an exchange relationship will generate informal norms 
and values that create a relational governance form to manage the exchange. This leads to 
improved business outcomes, and enhances cooperation and the level of coordination in business 
relationships (Sande and Haugland 2015). This postulation of RCT supports the hypothesis, which 
found a negative association between the level of trust and hidden action problems in an exchange 
relationship between the policyholder and the insurer. 
Writing a comprehensive contract—especially long-term ones—to govern an exchange 
relationship can be problematic, as information gathered over time and the agent’s performance 
will reveal more about his characteristics. This information, ex-ante, will significantly lower the 
transaction cost from the principal’s perspective. Therefore, reputation (based on past transactions) 
and trust (based on expected future outcome) is essential in an exchange relationship. These foster 
better channel performance and lead to sustainability.  
This argument in RCT is consistent with the findings of one of the hypotheses, which adduces that 
the degree of trust in an exchange relationship attenuates hidden action by policyholders. As trust 
prevails in business, confidence grows and relations improve, fostering coordination, cooperation, 
and interdependencies, with mutual interests, shared goals and norms ensuring efficiency and 
business continuity between the exchange partners, thus attenuating hidden action problems. This 
work is in line with the theoretical foundation (RCT) and corroborates its underlying assertions of 
how the degree of trust enhances business outcomes and performance, hence mitigating or 
eliminating hidden action problems (Parker and Hartley 2003). 
Self-protection and hidden action problems 
Agency theory predicts that once the contractual agreement has been signed, the principal can 
hardly monitor the degree of self-protection effort the agent makes. The cost of investing in self-
protection or making the effort will determine the agent’s (policyholder) level of effort. Whether 
it is high or low, it will yield some stochastic gains to the principal (insurer). The level of the 
principal’s gain is likely to be higher if the agent chooses a high level of self-protection, but the 
principal cannot observe the choice of the agent. He might promise a reward to the agent, but based 
on his realized gain and not necessarily on the degree of self-protection or effort made by the agent. 
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Agents tend to react according to the expected profit maximization or liability in a given contract 
(Keser and Willinger 2007) 
It follows that the kind of contract agreed upon between the agent (policyholder) and the principal 
(insurer) largely influences the degree of self-protection or effort invested in by the policyholder 
to mitigate or significantly reduce the probability of a risk occurring. This study traced the same 
pattern and the authors observed the varying impacts of different contract types—co-payment and 
deductible—on the degree of hidden action. This represents an extension and support of the agency 
theory by providing empirical justification for the relationship between self-protection or its effort 
and the kind of contract in a principal-agent relationship (Chang, Kang, and Li 2015).  
In short, the degree of risk-prevention effort made by the policyholder—i.e. self-protection—has 
a direct correlation with the expected profitability of the insurer. The higher the self-protection by 
the policyholder, the higher is the insurer’s expected profit. Therefore, it is prudent for the insurer 
to design a contract that will transfer some liability to the policyholder by inducing a high level of 
self-protection or its effort in their self-interest. This contract type, especially with the co-payment 
rider, can serve as an effective measure to attenuate hidden action problems (Keser and Willinger 
2000). One of the hypotheses of this study postulated that the association between self-protection 
and hidden action problems is more negatively shaped when the contract transfers some liability 
to the policyholder. The findings of the study corroborate this, providing support to the agency 
theory.  
9.3.2 Managerial Implications 
It is important to apply the findings to the real world effectively, as the existing theories fully 
support these. The outcome of this study will be useful for managers and practitioners in the 
insurance and related industries to improve their relationship with their trading partners, thus 
strengthening coordination, cooperation, and integration in their operations. This will grow their 
market share, increase their profitability, and make their business sustainable by offering them a 
competitive advantage in the market. 
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Co-payment as effective attenuation of hidden action  
The researchers observed that the nature of contracting was a crucial ingredient to determine the 
degree of self-protection and the eventual size of damages the insurers would have to pay the 
policyholder. Based on this finding, managers and practitioners can utilize the co-payment 
contractual term, instead of the deductible, as an efficient deterrent against hidden action problems. 
The co-payment rider induces policyholders to invest in self-protection significantly to avert any 
potential damage. Since the degree of the damage would dictate their contribution to the 
indemnification, the ramifications of a big loss on their business would be far-reaching (Qingyue, 
Liying, and Beibei 2011).  
However, it is worthwhile to note that including a co-payment rider in contracts is not a fixed rule. 
The manager would be in a better position to categorize their customers based on their risk profile 
and their degree of risk aversion, and consider other variables to determine the most befitting form 
of contract. This will satisfy the policyholder and enhance business performance (Tumay 2009). 
Pre-screening as a proactive measure to mitigate hidden action 
Another useful implication of this study for managers in the insurance sector is that they should 
develop a comprehensive and flexible pre-screening strategy that can be adapted to the changing 
market realities and policyholders’ expectations, thus minimizing market asymmetries. This will 
drastically reduce or even eliminate hidden action problems in the Egyptian car insurance market, 
as the quality of pre-screening and the frequencies and magnitude of claims by policyholders are 
largely correlated (Smart 2000). 
When effectively executed, the process leads to self-selection. That is, policyholders with the 
profile the insurer is looking for based on some categorization will buy the right policy, thus 
obviating the problem of adverse selection, which may precipitate moral hazard or hidden action 
problems. The insurer will then be able to make better estimates of the claims and profitability for 
a certain period. This will reduce the amount of money insurance companies have to put aside as 
loss reserve, and improve their cash flow, health of balance sheet, and profitability (Crocker and 
Snow 2011). 
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Importance of trust in increasing cooperation and coordination in B2B 
The objective of any business relationship is that the trading partners should deliver their part of 
the bargain, i.e. meet a given obligation in the exchange relationship. Therefore, it is prudent to 
keep a mechanism in place, which will make both partners fully accountable to fulfil their 
obligations. The degree of cooperation and coordination between channel partners is critical for 
the overall business performance. Businesses tend to prefer long-term relationships, in which 
interaction changes into integration and increased trust. This ensures that certain norms and values 
dictate the exchange, improving the degree of coordination and cooperation between partners 
(Buvik and Halskau 2001, Lusch and Brown 1996). Nonetheless, with information asymmetries 
in the insurance market, forming such relationships can be a challenge. Since trading partners have 
access to varying information, some partners tend to behave opportunistically because of an 
informational advantage and use it for their gain or business advantage. This affects the 
relationship, hinders performance, and even leads to abrupt termination of the exchange 
relationship. 
The implication of this study for managers is that they should forge strong relationships with 
important trading partners, based on trust and performance. This will lead to longer-term 
relationships between insurers and policyholders, thus significantly reducing the likelihood of 
hidden action problems, which in turn improves coordination and cooperation between the trading 
partners—i.e. improves business outcomes between the insurer and policyholders—and leads to 
increased market opportunities and profitability. 
 
9.4 Limitations of the Study 
One of the main limitations of this work is the sample size. The researchers collected 63 samples 
during the field survey. This is a small sample size taking into account factor loading, which 
emphasizes the need for larger samples in a study. A smaller sample size results in reduced factor 
loading because of the standard error. As extant literature emphasizes, a sample size of 100 is 
sufficient for detailed factor analysis to prevent non-convergence and over-determination in the 
analysis. 
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Another major constraint was time. Hence, the researchers collected samples from the major non-
life insurance companies in Cairo. Since most of the big insurance companies have their 
headquarters in the commercial capital of Egypt, the sample would sufficiently represent the 
population (the Egyptian insurance industry). In addition, the authors did not collect samples from 
the Takafuls, which carry out insurance activities based on Islamic sharia principals. 
 
9.5 Future Direction 
The focus of the study was on seller dependence, i.e. the degree of hidden action by policyholders 
and its consequences for the insurer. Thus, there is an opportunity to examine bilateral dependence 
between the insurer and policyholders. This will provide detailed information about the power 
relation between the trading partners, and highlight symmetrical causes of hidden action problems, 
thus providing the opportunity to eliminate it and foster better cooperation between the parties in 
the exchange relationship.  
Further research can be done by increasing the sample size to enhance reliability and validity, thus 
reducing the size of standard error. There is also opportunity for more research on the relations 
between the different partners in the insurance value chain—for example, between brokers and 
insurance companies, policyholders and brokers, the regulatory authority and insurance 
companies, and so on. Other forms of insurance activities, like the Takaful, which works on Islamic 
sharia principles, could also be studied to examine how the dynamics of the governance structure 
and their relationship with their policyholders and channel partners are different from those 
dictated by conventional forms of business examined in this work.  
Moreover, further research can concentrate on both parties in the dyadic relationship, i.e. 
simultaneously obtain data from both the policyholders and the insurance companies, to get a better 
and clearer picture of the direct interaction between the partners in a buyer-seller relationship with 
regard to hidden action problems. 
Another interesting direction for future research would be to take into account the ongoing 
technological revolution, which has led to the invention of myriads of devices that can monitor 
seamlessly and real-time, and transfer the required data simultaneously. How technology has 
changed the business landscape and made ex-post monitoring possible and inexpensive—the 
degree of hidden action under technological black boxes so to speak—would be interesting to 
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investigate. Research can also concentrate on comparing customers’ ex-post actions when they are 
under technological supervision and when they are not.  
In short, the interaction between the policyholder and the insurer is dynamic and keeps evolving 
over time. It depends on different factors and the ever-changing market realities are evident in it. 
The hypotheses of this study and the outcome resulted from a cross-sectional study of the car 
insurance market in Egypt. Thus, it is significant and valid only for a point in time based on 
samples collected from the Egyptian insurance industry. Hence, it is necessary to carry out 
longitudinal studies considering market trends and patterns over time, which can suggest critical 
decisions, causalities, and movements between insurers and policyholders. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
Dear Respondent, 
RE: SURVEY ON HIDDEN ACTION PROBLEMS: THE CASE OF 
INSURERS AND BUSINESS POLICYHOLDERS IN THE EGYPTIAN CAR 
INSURANCE MARKET. 
This is a master thesis study under the supervision of Professor Arnt Buvik, at Molde University 
College, a specialized University in Logistics, Molde Norway. The main objective is to study 
buyer-seller relationships within the insurance industry in Egypt. We are currently conducting a 
survey on the subject matter above for our master’s degree thesis.  
The Egyptian insurance industry is very important because it contributes to the GDP of the 
Egyptian economy and generate a lot of employment opportunities for professionals across the 
regions of the country. The Egyptian insurance industry in gross premium volume amounted to 
LE 14.4 billion in 2013/2014, as well as its effect on boost economic growth in different sectors. 
The result of this survey will reinforce a better understanding of the key factors that should be 
taken into consideration when it comes to the formulation of the policies for dealing with different 
business policyholders in the Egyptian car insurance industry. Written master thesis for academic 
purposes will be provided as an output of this survey as well as a practical summary of findings 
and implications which may be provided to you upon your request.  
Information involved in this questionnaire is robustly confidential and no individual respondent 
will be specified as a rebuttal to each question will be aggregated to assist in the final analysis of 
the information provided in this questionnaire, therefore it is not possible to assign information 
given in the survey to individual respondents.   
This survey involves only a small sample of insurers in Cairo, therefore your response is extremely 
important. Kindly take a few moments to complete the questionnaire below by answering all 
questions accurately reflecting the real situation regarding your relationship with your major 
policyholders of car insurance. Particularly with respect to the most recent cases of conflicts or 
settlements after asking for compensation.  
Thank you in advance for taking time to answer the questionnaire. Your support in this study is 
highly appreciated. 
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A: Background information to the company  
1. Company name 
2. Number of employees both full time and part time 
3. Choose one of your most recent insurance compensation cases by business policyholders: 
Name of the policyholder-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Case number--------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sincerely, 
Eslam Sayed Mohamed Thabet 
Molde University College 
P.O. Box 2110, 6402 Molde 
Norway 
+201095353443; +4745052181 
eslam.s.m.thabet@stud.himolde.no 
 
 
 
Professor Arnt Buvik (Supervisor) 
Molde University College 
P.O. Box 2110, 6402 Molde 
Norway 
Arnt.buvik@himolde.no 
 
 
 
125 
 
B: Based on the policyholder you have identified above, please circle the number that best represents 
your view regarding the following statements 
 
1- This policyholder sometimes does not adhere to 
the commitment to use his cars for the purpose 
agreed upon in the insurance policy in order to 
get different incentives from my company. He 
uses his cars for purposes other than that 
mentioned in the policy 
 
2- When an accident occurs, this policyholder 
claims a huge (abnormal) amount of damages 
from my company 
 
3- When an accident occurs, this policyholder does 
not inform my company on time. He does it later, 
which is against the terms of the contract 
 
4- This policyholder sometimes makes false 
promises and claims regarding the maintenance 
of the cars, for which he does not go to the 
original brand centre or the approved garages, as 
specified in the agreement 
 
5- This policyholder occasionally lies or makes 
misleading assertions regarding buying/hiring 
safety devices and parking his cars in proper 
garages, which was a prerequisite ex-ante the 
contract approval 
Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7 
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6- This policyholder sometimes does not report 
violation of traffic rules by his drivers or 
carelessness or reckless behaviour on their part, 
leading to an accident or to an increase in the 
chance of it 
 
 
We assume that you know something about to what extent this policyholder invest in self-
protection, such as actions of the policyholder that he takes to protect himself against the potential 
risks. 
C: Based on the policyholder you have identified above, please circle the number that best 
represents your view regarding the following statements 
 
1- This policyholder never leaves the car 
unlocked  
 
2- This policyholder never leaves the car 
engine running  
 
3- This policyholder never leaves the car with 
a window/the roof open  
 
4- This policyholder never allows another 
person to drive the car without the insurer’s 
permission  
 
5- This policyholder never crosses the state 
borders in the car, against the domestic 
insurance policy  
 
Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
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6- This policyholder always follows traffic 
rules  
 
7- The drivers of this policyholder’s firm 
never drive the cars without using the 
seatbelt  
 
8- This policyholder always parks his cars in 
private locked garages equipped with anti-
lock system  
 
9- The policyholder never gets some parts of 
the cars repaired during maintenance 
without the insurer’s permission  
 
10- The drivers of this firm never break the 
speed limit while driving the cars 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7 
 
 
 
 
 
 1        2         3         4         5          6           7 
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Regarding every action of self-protection actions, there is a cost which must be incurred by the 
policyholder. If this cost is high, thereby the motivation of the policyholder to incur such cost will 
be minimized. 
D: Based on the policyholder you have identified above, please circle the number that best 
represents your view regarding the following statements 
 
1- This policyholder always uses high quality 
tracking devices 
 
2- This policyholder always follows high-
standard network subscription for the 
tracking devices   
 
3- This policyholder always uses high quality 
fire-extinguisher 
 
4- This policyholder always maintains his cars 
in the original center of the car’s brand 
 
5- This policyholder is buying/hiring safety 
garages for parking his cars 
Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
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Information system is one of the most important tools for your company in terms of gathering 
information about the policyholder with respect to different actions of self-protection as well as 
the quality of those actions. 
E: Based on the policyholder you have identified above, please circle the number that best 
represents your view regarding the following statements 
 
1- It is very difficult for our company to 
know/verify whether the policyholder’s 
drivers have driven under the influence of 
alcohol/drugs 
 
2- It is very difficult for our company to 
know/verify whether this policyholder has 
hired unqualified drivers 
 
3- It is very difficult for our company to 
know/verify whether this policyholder has 
given correct information about the daily 
working hours of the car 
 
4- It is very difficult for our company to get 
exact or accurate information about 
whether this policyholder has adhered to 
the specified load capacity 
 
5- It is very difficult for our company to 
know/verify whether this policyholder left 
the car with keys/fobs attached to the 
switch 
 
Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
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6- It is very difficult for our company to get 
exact or accurate information about 
whether this policyholder has used the car 
for purposes other than that mentioned in 
the insurance policy 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
The determination of the claims amount is based on the comparison between the car pre-screening 
and the car screening after the accident has been occurred. Therefore the accuracy of pre-screening 
and screening provide the insurer with the possibility to determine the correct claim. 
F: Based on the case you have identified above, please circle the number that best represents 
your view regarding the following statements 
 
1- Before we signed the contract, we 
confirmed that this policyholder fulfilled 
the specific number of kilometres to get 
the insurance policy  
 
2- Before we signed the contract, we 
confirmed that this policyholder met the 
age requirement of the car (6 years) to get 
the insurance policy  
 
3- Before we signed the contract, we 
confirmed that the cars of this 
policyholder had no record of a collision 
or a serious accident  
 
4- Before we signed the contract, we 
checked that this policyholder provided 
the required documents, such as the 
Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
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traffic certificate, and met other 
regulatory requirements  
 
5- Before we signed the contract, we 
checked that this policyholder kept 
regular maintenance record  
 
6- Before we signed the contract, we 
confirmed that this policyholder has 
hired insured motorists 
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
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If efforts of prevention are not observable, that is under moral hazard, policyholders have an 
incentive to exert the maximum level of effort only if the insurance contract satisfies. Your 
company may offer some of prevention incentives in order to motivate the policyholder to invest 
heavily in self-protection against the potential risk. 
G: Based on the case you have identified above, please circle the number that best represents 
your view regarding the following statements  
 
1- Our company has charged (differentiated 
premiums) lower premiums to careful 
policyholders, those that can prove that 
they take effective measures to reduce 
the insured risks 
 
2- Our company has used a deductible 
which is a provision in an insurance 
policy under which the person buying 
insurance has to pay the initial damages 
up to some set limit 
 
3- Our company has used a co-payment 
which is a provision in an insurance 
policy under which the policyholder 
picks up some percentage of the bill for 
damages when there is a claim 
 
4- Our company provides this policyholder 
a bonus incentive in case that there is no 
accidents within the first contract period  
 
Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
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5- Our company has implemented the 
reward schedule which represents an 
enforceable contract (i.e., if there is a 
dispute about whether a player has lived 
up to the terms of the contract, then a 
court or similar body can adjudicate the 
dispute  
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
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H: Based on the case you have identified above, please circle the number that best represents 
your view regarding the following statements 
 
1- This policyholder fulfils the promises it 
makes to our company regarding actions 
or effort of self-protection  
 
2- We trust that this policyholder follows the 
guidelines of our formal agreements 
  
3- Our company trusts that this policyholder 
provides complete and accurate 
information  
 
4- Our company considers this policyholder 
friendly and trustworthy because of his 
truthfulness in previous dealings  
 
5- Going by his/her previous actions and 
activities, I trust that this policyholder’s 
future decisions and actions will not 
adversely affect our company  
 
6- This policyholder has high levels of 
integrity and honesty with regard to my 
company’s business dealings  
 
7- This policyholder always keeps the 
promises it makes to our company 
Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
 
 
 
  1        2         3         4         5          6           7  
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Thank You 
 
 
I: Kindly complete the following statements regarding the policyholder you have identified 
above by filling in the blank spaces or ticking where appropriate  
1- How long have you been doing business with this policyholder? ----------------- years  
2- How much in terms of monetary value did your company sell to this policyholder during the 
last year -------------------- USD $ (app. insurance premium paid last year)  
3- How many claims did your company receive from this policyholder during the last year? -----
----------  
4- How much in terms of monetary value did your company pay to this policyholder during the 
last year for the received claims? -------------------- USD $ 
5- Does your company sell other insurance policies to this policyholder beside car insurance 
policies? Yes --------- No ----------  
6- How many insurance policies did your company trade with this policyholder during the last 
year? 
7- What sales/turnover did your company have during the last year? ------------- USD $ 
8- What kind of contract is established by your company in order to eliminate moral hazard?          
 (a) Deductible (b) Co-payment (c) Others (mention) ------------------------ 
9- Are you a member of any insurance association? Yes ---------- No ---------- 
If Yes; Organization name------------- 
10- What is the approximate total sales/turnover of this policyholder? Yes ------ No ----- 
11- What is the type of the policyholder’s company? (a) National  (b) multinational  (c) universal 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Normality 
 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
HIDDENACT1 2.00 7.00 5.3810 1.11339 -.378- .302 .381 .595 
HIDDENACT2 1.00 7.00 3.9048 2.01378 .000 .302 -1.221- .595 
HIDDENACT3 2.00 7.00 5.5397 1.02902 -.981- .302 2.847 .595 
HIDDENACT4 2.00 7.00 4.8095 1.47951 -.278- .302 -.588- .595 
HIDDENACT5 1.00 7.00 4.3333 1.31982 -.473- .302 -.426- .595 
HIDDENACT6 1.00 7.00 3.1587 2.05730 .583 .302 -1.002- .595 
SELFPROT1 1.00 7.00 4.0000 1.60644 .241 .302 -1.123- .595 
SELFPROT2 1.00 7.00 3.8730 1.74589 .013 .302 -1.304- .595 
SELFPROT3 1.00 7.00 3.2063 1.51507 1.046 .302 .209 .595 
SELFPROT4 1.00 7.00 3.9206 2.02645 -.093- .302 -1.454- .595 
SELFPROT5 1.00 7.00 5.6190 2.18815 -1.363- .302 .318 .595 
SELFPROT6 1.00 7.00 4.2857 1.63064 -.111- .302 -1.156- .595 
SELFPROT7 2.00 7.00 3.9048 1.62356 .392 .302 -1.306- .595 
SELFPROT8 1.00 7.00 3.9365 2.69930 .009 .302 -1.878- .595 
SELFPROT9 1.00 7.00 4.2381 1.73869 -.208- .302 -1.312- .595 
SELFPROT10 1.00 7.00 3.0000 1.72271 .684 .302 -.673- .595 
ASYMMINFO1 1.00 7.00 3.8413 1.88548 .058 .302 -1.347- .595 
ASYMMINFO2 1.00 7.00 3.8730 1.74589 .013 .302 -1.304- .595 
ASYMMINFO3 1.00 7.00 3.6984 1.89766 .363 .302 -1.016- .595 
ASYMMINFO4 1.00 7.00 3.9206 2.02645 -.093- .302 -1.454- .595 
ASYMMINFO5 1.00 7.00 5.6190 2.18815 -1.363- .302 .318 .595 
ASYMMINFO6 1.00 6.00 3.3492 1.44979 -.149- .302 -1.238- .595 
PRESCREEN1 1.00 6.00 3.2698 1.41657 -.006- .302 -1.018- .595 
PRESCREEN2 1.00 6.00 3.4762 1.62498 -.049- .302 -1.285- .595 
PRESCREEN3 2.00 7.00 4.6190 1.06904 -.239- .302 .798 .595 
PRESCREEN4 3.00 7.00 5.3651 .78907 -.961- .302 1.084 .595 
PRESCREEN5 5.00 7.00 6.7143 .58000 -1.934- .302 2.733 .595 
PRESCREEN6 1.00 7.00 5.1111 1.09414 -1.219- .302 2.553 .595 
TRUST1 1.00 7.00 3.8413 1.88548 .058 .302 -1.347- .595 
TRUST2 1.00 7.00 4.4603 1.85634 -.162- .302 -1.093- .595 
TRUST3 1.00 7.00 3.6984 1.89766 .363 .302 -1.016- .595 
TRUST4 1.00 7.00 3.8730 1.48641 .316 .302 -.878- .595 
TRUST5 1.00 7.00 4.0635 1.52266 .116 .302 -.486- .595 
TRUST6 1.00 7.00 3.4603 1.78547 .322 .302 -1.188- .595 
TRUST7 1.00 7.00 3.5397 1.94128 .327 .302 -1.414- .595 
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Appendix 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model Fit (n=63) 
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Appendix 4 (a): Residual Distribution Chart 
 
 
Appendix 4 (b): Normal Probability Plot for Normality Assessment 
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Appendix 5(a): Research’s Model Summary 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .616a .380 .314 .80591 .380 5.720 6 56 .000 
2 .659b .435 .363 .77656 .435 6.040 7 55 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SELFPROT X KINDCONTRAC, TRUST, KINDCONTRAC, SIZOFDAMAGE, PRESCREEN, 
SELFPROT, ASYMMINFO 
b. Predictors: (Constant), KINDCONTRAC, SIZOFDAMAGE, PRESCREEN, TRUST, SELFPROT, ASYMMINFO 
c. Dependent Variable: HIDDENACT          
Appendix 5(b): Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 22.291 6 3.715 5.720 .000a 
Residual 36.372 56 .649 
  
Total 58.663 62 
   
b. Predictors: (Constant), TRUST, KINDCONTRAC, SIZOFDAMAGE, PRESCREEN, 
SELFPROT, ASYMMINFO 
2 Regression 25.496 7 3.642 6.040 .000b 
Residual 33.167 55 .603 
  
Total 58.663 62 
   
a. Dependent Variable: HIDDENACT  
c. Predictors: (Constant), SELFPROT X KINDCONTRAC, KINDCONTRAC, 
SIZOFDAMAGE, PRESCREEN, TRUST, SELFPROT, ASYMMINFO 
 
